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Abstract:
Games with strategic complements have the property that best response set of a player is
increasing in the strategies of opponents in the standard lattice set order. Normal form games
with strategic complements have been extensively studied in the literature. Such property in
extensive form games are less well studied and turns out to be hard to analyze. This dissertation
studies strategic complements in extensive form games.
Echenique (2004) has a definition for extensive form game with strategic complements. We
show in Chapter 2 that there are many cases of interest that are beyond his definition. Even
simple two-stage 2 × 2 game does not satisfy his definition. More generally, we characterize
when two-stage 2 × 2 game have strategic complements. This shows the aspects of strategic
complements not captured by standard definition.
Another way to analyze 2-stage games is to look at their reduced normal form (Mailath,
Samuelson and Swinkels (1993)). In Chapter 3, we show that standard ordinal strategic comple-
mentarity conditions imposed on the reduced normal form are not sufficient to generate strategic
complements in the extensive form. Semi no crossing conditions are added to make it sufficient.
Moreover, I provide conditions on the reduced normal form to characterize strategic complements
in the two-stage games. I also show how to recover the extensive form from the reduced normal
form by applying the algorithm in (MSS (1994)).
In Chapter 4, I study strategic complements in more general two-player multi-stage games.
I show that in response to different classes of opponent’s strategies, the corresponding best
response sets must include strategies that can generate certain paths of play once the conditions
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Games of strategic complements (GSC) and Games of strategic substitutes (GSS) formal-
ize basic strategic interactions and have widespread applications. In GSC, best response
of each player is weakly increasing in actions of the other players, whereas GSS have the
characteristic that the best response of each player is weakly decreasing in the actions of
the other players.
This paper focused on games with strategic complements. A few key papers laid the
theoretical foundation for this line of research. Supermodular games were first introduced
by Topiks (1979), followed by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), Lippman,
Mamer, and McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988). And further analyzed by Vives (1990) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) in which they slightly weakened the definition of supermodu-
lar games, contributed to new examples and extended the analysis to broader equilibrium
concepts. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) provided ordinal notions of complements and
thus defining a more generalized class of games with complementarity property. In this
body of work, static games with complements have been investigated. Strong results on
the existence of Nash equilibria have been derived, along with comparative statics theo-
rems. Along with Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Zhou (1994), Shannon (1995), Villas-Boas
(1997), Edlin and Shannon (1998), Echenique (2002), Echenique (2004) and Quah (2007),
among others. Extensive bibliographies are available in Topkis (1998), in Vives (1999),
and in Vives (2005).
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The toolbox commonly used to deal with complements are monotone comparative stat-
ics. This technique is used to exploit fully both order and monotonicity properties. Two
critical concepts were introduced, that is, supermodularity and increasing difference. In
Euclidean applications, supermodularity means that increasing any subset of the decision
variable raises the incremental returns associated with increases in the others. Similarly,
increasing differences means that increasing a parameter raises the marginal return to ac-
tivities. As Topkis (1978) indicates, supermodularity and increasing differences are easily
characterized for smooth functions on Rn. Quasi-supermodularity conditions and single
crossing conditions used in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) are weaker than the two cardinal
notions. In particular, supermodular functions are important subset of quasisupermod-
ular functions. The actual relation between supermodularity and quasisupermodularity
involves transformations on restricted domains.
Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) in which the payoff function satisfying decreas-
ing single-crossing condition cannot always be considered as a GSC. Roy and Sabarwal
(2012) used a three-player Hawk Dove game to demonstrate the standard technique of
reversing the order on strategy space of a play in a GSS to yield a GSC failed to apply to
more than one player.
This class of games have deeper connection with strategic situations such as arms
races, banks runs, currency crisis, Research and development race, technology adoption
and many other topics (Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Topkis (1998), and Vives (1999)).
Thus normal form games with strategic complements are considered to be very common
and useful game structure.
However, researches has been done but not exhaustively explored beyond the scope of
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static games and into dynamic games with strategic complements.
Within the scope of dynamic games with strategic complements, two directions have
been explored, that is, extensive form games (Echenique(2004)) and stochastic games
(Amir (1996, 2010), Curtat (1993), Balbus, Reffette and Wozny (2014)).
Echenique (2004) extended the static concept into extensive form games and defined
extensive form game of strategic complementarities, that is, all normal form of the sub-
games in the extensive form are normal form games with strategic complementarities
respecting Milgrom and Shannon’s definition. He showed that the set of subgame-perfect
equilibria in this class of games is a non-empty, complete lattice. The result is limited
because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities defined in this way turned
out to be a very restrictive class of games.
Full characterization of the set of equilibria of a stochastic game is an intractable
problem in many cases, due to the complex dynamic structure of these equilibria. The
literature choose to look at a relatively tractable objective, Markov equilibria. In a Markov
equilibria, player’s action at each period are a function of current state variable only. Even
those equilibria with relatively simple dynamic structure are difficult to analyze.
Curtat (1993) proved the existence of stationary Markov equilibria in pure strategies
for a class of stochastic games with assumption of complementarity, monotonicity and di-
agonal domiance. In Amir(2001), with one-period rewards and state transitions satisfying
some complementarity and monotonicity conditions, the existence of Markov-stationary
equilibria is proved for the finite and infinite horizon game. Balbus, Reffette and Wozny
(2014) studied infinite discounted stochastic games with strategic complementarities and
proved the existence of a stationary Markov Nash equilibrium as well as provided method
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for constructing this least and greatest equilibrium via a simple approximation schemes.
I focused on extensive form games and strategic complements, in particular, an im-
portant class of extensive form games: multi-stage games.
In Chapter 2, we study a simple two-stage 2 × 2 game. Under differential payoff to
outcome assumption, we first characterize when a player exhibits strategic complements
in this game. Echenique (2004)’s definition for extensive form game with strategic com-
plements, an extension of standard ordinal complementarities conditions in normal form
games, rules out all such cases. Moreover, we show when a player exhibits strategic com-
plements in a general two-stage 2× 2 game removing the payoff restrictions. This shows
the aspects of strategic complements not captured by standard definition.
For extensive form games, the dimensions of strategy space can be huge. This im-
posed considerable difficulty in analysing strategic complements. In Chapter 3, we show
that it is possible to properly reduce the strategy space (MSS(1994)) to facilitate the
process without loosing generality in a two-stage 2 × 2 game. we show that standard
ordinal strategic complementarity conditions imposed on the reduced normal form are
not sufficient to generate strategic complements in the extensive form. Semi no crossing
conditions are added to make it sufficient. Moreoever, I provide conditions on the reduced
normal form to characterize strategic complements in the two-stage games.
In Chapter 4, I study the strategic complements in general multi-stage 2-player games.
I show that in response to different classes of opponent’s strategies, to generate strategic
complements, the corresponding best response sets must include all strategies that gener-
ate certain paths of play once the conditions are met. I characterize the structure of best
response sets necessary to exhibit strategic complements.
4
Chapter 2
2 Two-stage Games with Strategic Complements
2.1 Example
We start with a motivating two-stage 2 × 2 game example. We show that this simple
extensive form game exhibits strategic complements. We also point out that it is ruled
out by the existing definition of extensive form game of strategic complements.
It is commonly accepted that a game exhibits strategic complements if player i’s best
response sets weakly increase in the standard lattice set order when player i’s opponents
increases their strategies. Consider the following two-stage 2× 2 game with the assigned
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Figure 1: Stage 1 game
Depending on the outcome in the first period, a second stage game is played with the
normal forms in Figure 2. In particular, game 1 is played if A01 and B01 are played in the
first stage, game 2 is played if A01 and B02 are played in the first stage. Following a play
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Figure 2: Stage 2 games
Figure 3. is the extensive form of the two stage game with payoff assigned at terminal
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Impose the following order on the actions: An1 ≺ An2 , Bn1 ≺ Bn2 , n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. For
convenience, we denote the subgame reached when A01 and B01 are played in the first stage
Subgame 1. Similarly, we denote from left to right Subgame 2, Subgame 3 and Subgame
4. For player 1, it is easy to see that whenever Subgame 1 is reached on the path of
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profile, choosing action A11 will yield a strictly higher payoff for player 1 in response to
any player 2’s choice in that subgame.
When respond to player 2’s strategy with B01 played in the first stage, selecting A01 in
the first stage to reach subgame 1 then choosing A11 will yield strictly higher payoff for
player 1 than any other strategies. Similarly, in response to player 2’s strategy with B02
being played in the first stage, player 1 will best respond by playing A01 in the first stage
then playing A22 in Subgame 2 and indifferent among the choices in rest of the subgames.
It is easy to see that this game exhibits strategic complements.
However, this game does not satisfy quasi-supermodularity conditions and single cross-
ing conditions imposed by Echenique (2004) thus is not an extensive-form game of strate-
gic complementarities. In fact, we showed in Section 2.3 that under differential payoff to
outcome assumption, the two-stage games with payoff assignments satisfying the exist-
ing conditions have measure zero. However, the measure of two-stage games exhibiting
strategic complements with differential payoff at terminal nodes is strictly positive.
2.2 Basic Framework
Consider a two-stage two-player game played in the following way. In the first stage,
player 1 and 2 plays game 0. Player 1 chooses between A01 and A02, player 2 chooses in
B01 and B02 . Depending on the outcome in the first game, a different second-stage game
is played. If A01 and B01 is chosen, game 1 is played; if A01 and B02 is chosen, game 2
is played; if A02 and B01 is chosen, game 3 is played and if A02 and B02 is chosen, game
4 is played. And depending on the game played, player 1 chooses between An1 and An2
7
and player 2 chooses between Bn1 and Bn2 , n = 1, 2, 3, 4. The set of player 1’s strategy is
S = {(s0, s1, s2, s3, s4) : sn ∈ Sn1 = {An1 , An1}, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and player 2’s strategy set
is T = {(t0, t1, t2, t3, t4) : tn ∈ Sn2 = {Bn1 , Bn2 }, n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.
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Figure 4: More General Game
Figure 2. is the extensive form Γ of the two-stage game with payoffs assigned at
terminal nodes.
Suppose An1 ≺ An2 and Bn1 ≺ Bn2 for n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Notice here pick any s, ŝ ∈ S,
s ≺ ŝ if ∀ n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, sn  ŝn and ∃ n′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} such that sn′ ≺ ŝn′ .
Similarly, t ≺ ŝ if ∀ n ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, tn  t̂n and there exist n′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} with
tn
′ ≺ ŝn′ .
Definition 1: Player i has strategic complements in Γ if for all subgames, player i’s
best response sets are increasing in strong set order with respect to player (-i)’ strategy
in that subgame.
Definition 2: The extensive form game Γ has strategic complements if both players
have strategic complements.
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Lemma 1. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
For every t̂, t̃ ∈ T , for every ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), and for every s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃), if t̂0 = t̃0, then
ŝ0 = s̃0.
Proof. Notice that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes has the following
implications for the structure of best responses. For every t ∈ T , and for every ŝ, s̃ ∈
BR1(t), the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (ŝ, t) is the same as the
subgame reached on the path of play for profile (s̃, t). Moreover, the actions played by
each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile (ŝ, t) are the same as
the actions played by each player in the subgame reached on the path of play for profile
(s̃, t). Furthermore, every s ∈ S that has the same actions as ŝ on the path of play for
profile (ŝ, t) is also a member of BR1(t).
To prove the lemma, fix t̂, t̃ ∈ T , ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), and s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃).
Suppose first that t̂0 = t̃0 = B01 , and suppose that ŝ0 = A01 and s̃0 = A02. Notice
that the structure of the best response of player 1 implies that s̃′ = (A02, A12, A22, s̃3, A42) ∈
BR1(t̃). Form t = (B02 , t̃1, t̃2, t̃3, t̃4) and consider s ∈ BR1(t). Then t̃  t, and using
strategic complements for player 1, it follows that s̃′∨s ∈ BR1(t). In particular, subgame
4 is reached with profile (s̃′ ∨ s, t), and therefore, s′ = (A02, A11, A21, A31, A42) ∈ BR1(t).
Moreover, t̃  t implies s′ = s′ ∧ s̃′ ∈ BR1(t̃). Notice that on path of play for profile
(s′, t̃), subgame 3 is reached and the action played by player 1 in subgame 3 is A31.
Consider ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) and notice that the structure of best response of player 1 implies
that ŝ′ = (A01, ŝ1, A21, A31, A41) ∈ BR1(t̂). Let t = t̂ ∧ t̃ and consider s ∈ BR1(t). As t  t̂,
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strategic complements for player 1 implies that s ∧ ŝ′ ∈ BR1(t). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s ∧ ŝ′, t), subgame 1 is reached, and therefore, the structure of best
response for player 1 implies that s′ = (A01, s1 ∧ ŝ1, A22, A32, A42) ∈ BR1(t). Using t  t̃
and strategic complements for player 1 implies that s′ ∨ s̃′ ∈ BR1(t̃). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s′ ∨ s̃′, t̃), subgame 3 is reached and the action played by player 1 in
subgame 3 is A32. As shown above, this is different from the action played by player 1 on
path of play for profile (s′, t̃), contradicting that both s′ and s′ ∨ s̃′ are best responses of
player 1 to t̃. The case where ŝ0 = A02 and s̃0 = A01 is proved similarly.
Now suppose t̂0 = t̃0 = B02 , and suppose that ŝ0 = A01 and s̃0 = A02. As subgame 2 is
reached on path of play for profile (ŝ, t̂), it follows that ŝ′ = (A01, A11, ŝ2, A31, A41) ∈ BR1(t̂).
Form t = (B01 , t̂1, t̂2, t̂3, t̂4) and consider s ∈ BR1(t). Then t  t̂, and using strategic
complements for player 1, it follows that ŝ′ ∧ s ∈ BR1(t). In particular, subgame 1 is
reached with profile (s∧ŝ′, t), and therefore, s′ = (A01, A11, A22, A32, A41) ∈ BR1(t). Moreover,
t  t̂ implies s′ = s′ ∨ ŝ′ ∈ BR1(t̂). Notice that on path of play for profile (s′, t̂), subgame
2 is reached and the action played by player 1 in subgame 3 is A22.
Consider s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) and notice that the structure of best response of player 1 implies
that s̃′ = (A02, A12, A22, A32, s̃4) ∈ BR1(t̃). Let t = t̂ ∨ t̃ and consider s ∈ BR1(t). As t̃  t,
strategic complements for player 1 implies that s̃′ ∨ s ∈ BR1(t). Notice that on path
of play for profile (s̃′ ∨ s, t), subgame 4 is reached, and therefore, the structure of best
response for player 1 implies that s′ = (A02, A11, A21, A31, s4 ∨ s̃4) ∈ BR1(t). Using t̂  t
and strategic complements for player 1 implies that ŝ′ ∧ s′ ∈ BR1(t̂). Notice that on path
of play for profile (ŝ′ ∧ s′, t̂), subgame 2 is reached and the action played by player 1 in
subgame 2 is A21. This is different from the action played by player 1 on path of play for
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profile (s′, t̂), contradicting that both s′ and ŝ′∧s′ are best responses of player 1 to t̂. The
case where ŝ0 = A02 and s̃0 = A01 is proved similarly.
Lemma 2. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and ŝ0 = A02, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), s0 = A02.
(2) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B02 and ŝ0 = A01, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), s0 = A01.
Proof. Notice that the assumption of differential payoffs to outcomes implies the following
about the structure of best responses: For every t ∈ T , and for every ŝ, s̃ ∈ BR1(t),
ŝ0 = s̃0. To prove statement (1), fix t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and ŝ0 = A02.
Form t = (B01 , B11 , B21 , B31 , B41) ∈ T and let s ∈ BR1(t). Then by the previous lemma,
s0 = ŝ0 = A02. Now fix arbitrarily t ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t). As t  t, strategic complements
implies that s ∨ s ∈ BR1(t). As s0 = A02, it follows that (s ∨ s)0 = A02. Finally, as noted
above, differential payoffs implies that s0 = (s ∨ s)0 = A02, as desired. Statement (2) is
proved similarly.
Lemma 3. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes and suppose player 1
exhibits strategic complements.
(1) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and ŝ0 = A01, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B01 then s1 = A11.
(2) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and ŝ0 = A02, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B01 then s3 = A31.
(3) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B02 and ŝ0 = A02, then for every
11
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B02 then s4 = A42.
(4) If there exists t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B02 and ŝ0 = A01, then for every
t ∈ T and for every s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B02 then s2 = A22.
Proof. To prove statement (1), fix t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and
ŝ0 = A01. Fix arbitrarily t ∈ T , s ∈ BR1(t) such that t0 = B01 . By lemma 1, s0 = A01,
and therefore, s′ = (A01, s1, A21, A31, A41) ∈ BR1(t). Let t = (B02 , t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ T and
s ∈ BR1(t). Structure of best responses implies that s′ = (s0, A11, s2, A31, s4) ∈ BR1(t).
Moreover, t  t and strategic complements implies that s′∧s′ ∈ BR1(t) and consequently,
structure of best responses implies that s1 = (s′ ∧ s′)1 = A11.
To prove statement (2), fix t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that t̂0 = B01 and ŝ0 = A02. Fix
arbitrarily t ∈ T , s ∈ BR1(t) such that t0 = B01 . By lemma 1, s0 = A02, and therefore,





3, A42) ∈ BR1(t). Let t = (B02 , t1, t2, t3, t4) ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t). By
previous lemma, s0 = A02, and therefore, s′ = (A02, A11, A21, A31, s4) ∈ BR1(t). Moreover,
t  t and strategic complements imply that (A02, A11, A21, A31, A42 ∧ s4) = s′ ∧ s′ ∈ BR1(t)
and consequently, structure of best responses implies that s3 = (s′ ∧ s′)3 = A31.
Statements (3) and (4) are proved similarly.
Whenever some subgames are reached on the best response path, Lemma 3 locates the
unique action that must be chosen in that subgame to generate strategic complements.
Definition 1. For m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, Ami strictly dominates
Anj if subgame m and n can be reached under the same stage 1 action for player 2, and
regardless of which action player 2 plays in subgame n, action Ami in subgame m gives
player 1 a higher payoff than Anj .
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Notice that this definition restricts comparison within the same subgame or between
subgame 1 and 3 only and between subgame 2 and 4 only. For example, for a com-
parison between subgame 1 and 3, action A11 strictly dominates action A31 implies that
min{a11, a12} > max{a31, a33}.
Theorem 1. Consider a game with differential payoffs to outcomes. The following are
equivalent.
1. Player 1 has strategic complements
2. Exactly one of the following holds
(a) A11 dominates A12, A31 and A32, and A22 dominates A21, A41 and A42.
(b) A11 dominates A12, A31 and A32, and A42 dominates A41, A21 and A22
(c) A31 dominates A32, A11 and A12, and A42 dominates A41, A21 and A22
Proof. For this proof, let T = {t ∈ T : t1 = B01} and T = {t ∈ T : t1 = B02}. For
sufficiency, suppose player 1 has strategic complements.
As case 1, suppose there exists t̂ ∈ T , there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that ŝ0 = A02.
Then lemma 3(2) implies that action A31 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 3.
In particular, whenever player 2 plays B01 in the first-stage game, player 1 chooses to reach
subgame 3 over subgame 1, and to play A31 in subgame 3, regardless of player 2 choice
in the second-stage game. Therefore, the minimum payoff to player 1 after playing A31
in subgame 3 must be larger than any given payoff to player 1 in subgame 1. Thus A31
strictly dominates A11 and A12 in subgame 1. Moreover, lemma 2(1) implies that for every
t ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t), if t0 = B02 , then s0 = A02, and therefore, lemma 3(3) implies that
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action A42 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 4. Reasoning as above, A42 strictly
dominates A21 and A22 in subgame 2, and therefore, statement 2(c) holds.
As case 2, suppose for every t̂ ∈ T , for every ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), ŝ = A01. Then lemma 3(1)
implies that action A11 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 1, and reasoning as
above, it follows that A11 strictly dominates A31 and A32 in subgame 3. Now consider T .
As subcase 1, suppose there exists t̃ ∈ T , there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) such that s̃0 = A01.
Then lemma 3(4) implies that action A22 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 2,
and that A22 strictly dominates A41 and A42 in subgame 2. Therefore, statement 2(a) holds.
As subcase 2, suppose for every t̃ ∈ T , for every s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃), s̃0 = A02. Then lemma 3(3)
implies that action A42 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 4, and that A42 strictly
dominates A21 and A22 in subgame 2. Therefore, statement 2(b) holds.
The reasoning above shows that one of the statements 2(a), 2(b), or 2(c) holds. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to check that the inequalities in these three statements imply that no
more than one of the statements holds, from which it follows that exactly one of these
three statements holds.
For necessity, suppose exactly one of 2(a), 2(b), or 2(c) holds. Suppose statement 2(a)
holds. In this case, for every t ∈ T , player 2 plays B01 , and given that action A11 is strictly
dominant for player 1 in subgame 1, and min{a11, a12} > max{a31, a32, a33, a34}, it follows that
player 1 chooses to reach subgame 1 over subgame 3. Therefore, the structure of best
response of player 1 is given by
BR1(t) = {(A01, A11, s2, s3, s4) ∈ S : sn ∈ {An1 , An2}, n = 2, 3, 4}.
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Notice that this is a sublattice of S. Similarly, for every t ∈ T , player 2 plays B02 , and
given that action A22 is strictly dominant for player 1 in subgame 2 and min{a23, a24} >
max{a41, a42, a43, a44}, it follows that player 1 chooses to reach subgame 2 over subgame 4,
and therefore, the structure of best response of player 1 is given by
BR1(t) = {(A01, s1, A22, s3, s4) ∈ S : sn ∈ {An1 , An2}, n = 1, 3, 4}.
Notice that this is a sublattice of S as well. Now consider arbitrary t̂, t̃ ∈ T such that
t̂  t̃. If t̂0 = t̃0, then the structure of best responses shows that BR1(t̂) = BR1(t̃), and
therefore, BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃). And if t̂0 = B01 and t̃0 = B02 , then from the structure of best
responses, it is easy to check that BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃). Thus, player 1 exhibits strategic
complements.
The cases where statement 2(b) or 2(c) holds are proved similarly.





4)} > max{a31, a32, a33, a34}, min{a23(> a21), a24(> a22)} > max{a41, a42, a43, a44}. State-





2)} > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}. Statement 2(c) is equivalent to min{a31(> a33), a32(>
a34)} > max{a11, a12, a13, a14}, and min{a43(> a41), a44(> a42)} > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}.
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From now on, we drop the assumption of distinct payoffs at terminal nodes. Lemma
4 indicated which subgames will be reached under strategic complementarity assump-
tions. Lemma 5, 6, 7 and 8 showed how strategic complementarities restrict on-the-path
subgames’ structures. We will show that after removing the payoff restrictions, strategic
complementarities allows richer subgame structures. However, some common structure
remains.
A few notations is introduced here to clarity the concept of strategic complementarities
in subgame n. Let Sn be the set of all strategies s ∈ S that allows subgame n to
reached on the path of (s, t) for some t ∈ T . Similarly, T n is defined as the set of all
strategies t ∈ T that allows subgame n to be reached on the path of (s, t) for some
s ∈ S. In particular, subgame 1 and subgame 2 can be reached when s0 = A01, thus
S1 = S2 = {s ∈ S| s0 = A01}, also denote S = {s ∈ S| s0 = A01}. Similarly, it is
easy to see that S3 = S4 = {s ∈ S| s0 = A02} , T 1 = T 3 = {t ∈ T | t0 = B01} and
T 2 = T 4 = {t ∈ T | t0 = B02}. Denote {s ∈ S| s0 = A02} = S, {t ∈ T | t0 = B01} = T and
{t ∈ T | t0 = B02} = T .
Definition 1b. For m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, Ami weakly dominates Anj
if subgame m and n can be reached under the same stage 1 action for player 2, and action
Ami in subgame m gives player 1 the same payoff or a higher payoff than Anj regardless of
what player 2 plays in subgame m and n.
Definition 2a. For m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i, j, s, t ∈ {1, 2}, Ami at Bms strictly
dominates Anj at Bnt if subgame m and n can be reached under the same stage 1 action
for player 2, and action Ami in subgame m gives player 1 a higher payoff than Anj when
player 2 plays Bm2 in subgame m and Bnt in subgame n.
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Definition 2b. For m, n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i, j, s, t ∈ {1, 2}, Ami at Bms weakly
dominates Anj at Bnt if subgame m and n can be reached under the same stage 1 action
for player 2, and action Ami in subgame m gives player 1 the same payoff or a higher payoff
than Anj when player 2 plays Bm2 in subgame m and Bnt in subgame n.
The definition of strategic complements applied to the two-stage game has the following
general implications.
Lemma 4. If player 1 exhibits strategic complements, then for arbitrary t̂, t̃ ∈ T , t̂2  t̃2
and t̂4  t̃4, BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃). It has the following implications:
(i). If subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂, then subgame 4 can be
reached on the best response paths to t̃
(ii). If only subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂, then only subgame
4 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃
(iii). If subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃, then subgame 2 can be
reached on the best response paths to t̂ and subgame 1 can be reached on the best response
paths to all t ∈ T .
(iv). If only subgame 2 can be reached on the best response path to t̃, then only subgame
2 can be reached on the best response path to t̂ and only subgame 1 can be reached on the
best response paths to all t ∈ T .
Proof. Fix such t̂, t̃ ∈ T . Form t′ = (B02 , t̂1 ∨ t̃1, t̃2, t̂3 ∨ t̃3, t̃4). Since t̂  t′, strategic
complements implies that BR1(t̂) v BR1(t′). Since t̃0 = t′0 = B02 , only subgame 2
and 4 can be reached with t̃ and t′. Since t′2 = t̃2 and t′4 = t̃4 in subgame 2 and 4,
BR1(t̃) = BR1(t′). Thus BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃).
(i). Fix t̂ and t̃. Since there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that ŝ0 = A02, pick arbitrary
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s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃). BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃) implies that s̃ ∨ ŝ ∈ BR1(t̃) and moreover, (s̃ ∨ ŝ)0 = A02.
Thus BR1(t̃) ∩ S 6= ∅.
(ii). Fix t̂ and t̃. Suppose there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) such that s̃0 = A01. Pick arbitrary
ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂). BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃) implies that s̃ ∧ ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), in particular, (s̃ ∧ ŝ)0 = A01.
Contradiction. Thus BR1(t̃) ⊆ S.
(iii). Fix t̂ and t̃. Pick arbitrary s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃), s̃0 = A01 and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂). BR1(t̂) v
BR1(t̃) implies that s̃ ∧ ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), moreover, (s̃ ∧ ŝ)0 = A01. Thus BR1(t̂) ∩ S 6= ∅.
Pick arbitrary t ∈ T . Form t′ = (B01 , t1 ∨ t̃1, t̃2, t3 ∨ t̃3, t̃4) and t′′ = (B01 , t1 ∨
t̃1, t2, t3 ∨ t̃3, t4). Since BR1(t′) = BR1(t′′) and t ≺ t′′, BR1(t) v BR1(t′). Form
t̃′ = (B02 , t
1 ∨ t̃1, t̃2, t3 ∨ t̃3, t̃4). Since t′ ≺ t̃′ and BR1(t̃) = BR1(t̃′), BR1(t′) v BR1(t̃).
Thus BR1(t) v BR1(t̃). Pick s ∈ BR1(t), BR1(t) v BR1(t̃) implies that s ∧ s̃ ∈ BR1(t),
moreover, (s ∧ s̃)0 = A01. Thus BR1(t) ∩ S 6= ∅.
(iv). Fix t̂ and t̃. Suppose there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂), ŝ0 = A02. Then pick arbitrary s̃ ∈
BR1(t̃), ŝ∨ s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃), moreover, (ŝ∨ s̃)0 = A02. Contradiction. Thus BR1(t̂) ⊆ S. Pick
arbitrary t ∈ T , form t′ = (B01 , t1, t2∧ t̃2, t3, t4∧ t̃4). Thus BR1(t) = BR1(t′). Form t̃′ =
(B02 , t
1, t̃2∧ t2, t3, t̃4∧ t4) and t̃′′ = (B02 , t1∧ t̃1, t2∧ t̃2, t3∧ t̃3, t4∧ t̃4). Since t̃′′ ≺ t̃ and
BR1(t̃′) = BR1(t̃′′), BR1(t̃′) v BR1(t̃). As t′ ≺ t̃′, strategic complementarities imply that
BR1(t′) v BR1(t̃′) and BR1(t′) v BR1(t̃). Since BR1(t) = BR1(t′), BR1(t) v BR1(t̃).
Suppose there exists s ∈ BR1(t), s0 = A02. Pick arbitrary s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃). BR1(t) v BR1(t̃)
implies s ∨ s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃), moreover, (s ∨ s̃)0 = A02. Contradiction. Thus BR1(t) ⊆ S.
Corollary 1. If player 1 exhibits strategic complements, then for arbitrary t̂, t̃ ∈ T ,
t̂1  t̃1 and t̂3  t̃3, BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃). It has the following implications:
(i). If subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃, then subgame 1 can be
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reached on the best response paths to t̂
(ii). If only subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃, then only subgame
1 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂
(iii). If subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂, then subgame 3 can be
reached on the best response paths to t̃ and subgame 3 can be reached on the best response
paths to all t ∈ T
(iv). If only subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂, then only subgame
3 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃ and only subgame 4 can be reached on the
best response paths to all t ∈ T .
Proof. Proved similarly to Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
(1). If subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T , then A22 weakly
dominates A21.
(2). If subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T , then A42 weakly
dominates A41 at t4.
(3). If subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T , then then for
every t̃ ∈ T such that subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths, A21 weakly
dominates A22 at t̃2.
(4). If A41 weakly dominates A42 at B41 and there exists t̂, t̃ ∈ T such that t̂4 = B41 , t̃4 = B42 ,
t̃2  t̂2, subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths to t̃ and subgame 4 can be
reached on the best response path to t̂, then A41 weakly dominates A42.
Proof. (1). Fix t̂ ∈ T and ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that ŝ0 = A01. Form t̃ = (B02 , t̂1, B21 , t̂3, t̂4).
Since t̃2  t̂2 and t̃4 = t̂4, Lemma 4 implies that there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) such that s̃0 = A01.
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Since only subgame 2 is reached on the path of (s̃, t̃), s̃′ = (A01, A12, s̃2, A32, A42) ∈ BR1(t̃).
Pick arbitrary t̂′ ∈ T , Lemma 4 implies that there exists ŝ′ ∈ BR1(t̂′) such that ŝ′0 = A01.
Sine subgame 1 is reached on the path of (ŝ′, t̂′), ŝ′′ = (A01, ŝ′1, A22, A32, A42) ∈ BR1(t̂′).
Lemma 4 implies that BR1(t̂′) v BR1(t̃) thus ŝ′′ ∨ ŝ′′ = (A01, A12, A22, A32, A42) ∈ BR1(t̃).
Since subgame 2 is reached on the path of (ŝ′′ ∨ ŝ′′, t̂′), (ŝ′ ∨ s′)2 ∈ BR2,1(t̂2) that is, A22 ∈
BR2,1(B21). Since player 1 has strategic complementarities in subgame 2, A22 ∈ BR2,1(B22).
Thus A22 is a weakly dominant strategy in subgame 2.
(2). Fix t̂ ∈ T such that there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) and ŝ0 = A02. Pick arbitrary t̃ ∈ T ,
Lemma 4(1) implies that BR1(t̃) v BR1(t̂). Pick arbitrary s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃). Since only
subgame 1 or 3 can be reached on the path of (s̃, t̃), s̃′ = (s̃0, s̃1, A22, s̃3, A42) ∈ BR1(t̃).
Thus s̃′ ∨ ŝ = (A02, s̃′1 ∨ ŝ1, A22, s̃′3 ∨ ŝ3, A42) ∈ BR1(t̂). Since subgame 4 is reached on the
path of (s̃′ ∨ ŝ, t̂), A42 ∈ BR1,4(t̂4).
(3). Fix t̂ ∈ T such that there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) and ŝ0 = A02 and fix t̃ ∈ T such that
there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) and s̃0 = A01. Form t̃′ = t̃ ∨ t̂, Lemma 5(1) implies that there
exists s̃′ ∈ BR1(t̃′) such that s̃′0 = A02. Since subgame 4 is reached on the path of (s̃′, t̃′),







′4) ∈ BR1(t̃′). t̃  t̃′ and strategic complements in player 1 implies
that ŝ′ ∧ s̃ = (A01, A11, A21, A31, s̃4 ∧ s̃′4) ∈ BR1(t̃). Since subgame 2 is reached on the path
of profile (s̃′ ∧ s̃, t̃), A21 ∈ BR1,2(t̃2).
(4). Since BR1(t̂) ∩ S 6= ∅, there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂) such that ŝ0 = A02 and moreover,
subgame 4 is reached on the path of (ŝ, t̂). Since t̂4 = B41 and A41 ∈ BR1,4(B41), ŝ′ =
(A02, ŝ
1, ŝ2, ŝ3, A41) ∈ BR1(t̂). Since BR1(t̃) ∩ S 6= ∅, there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) such that
s̃0 = A01. As only subgame 2 is reached on the path of (s̃, t̃), s̃′ = (A01, A12, s̃2, A32, A41) ∈
BR1(t̃). Since t̂4 ≺ t̃4 and t̂2  t̃2, Lemma 4 implies that BR1(t̂) v BR1(t̃). Thus
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s̃′ ∨ ŝ′ = (A02, A12, s̃2 ∨ ŝ2, A32, A41) ∈ BR1(t̃). Since subgame 4 is reached on the path of
profile (s̃′ ∨ ŝ′, t̃) and t̃4 = B42 , A41 ∈ BR1,4(B42).
Corollary 2. Suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
(1). If subgame 3 can be reached on the best response path to some t̂ ∈ T , then A31 weakly
dominates A32
(2). If subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to some t̂ ∈ T , then A11 weakly
dominates A12 at t̂1
(3). If subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to some t̂ ∈ T , then for all
t̃ ∈ T such that subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths, A32 weakly dominates
A31 at t̃3
(4). If A12 weakly dominates A11 at B12 and there exists t̂, t̃ ∈ T such that t̂1 = B12 , t̃1 = B11 ,
t̃3  t̂3, subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to t̂ and subgame 3 can be
reached on the best response path to t̃, then A12 weakly dominates A11.
Proof. Proved similarly as Lemma 5
Lemma 6. Suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements, if subgame 3 can be reached
on the best response paths of some t̂ ∈ T and subgame 2 can be reached on the best response
paths of some t̃ ∈ T , then
i. BR1(t̃) = BR1(t̂) = S.
ii. for t′ ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B41} ∪ {t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32}, BR1(t′) = S.
Proof. i. Fix t̂ ∈ T and t̃ ∈ T in the assumption. Then there exists s̃ ∈ BR1(t̃) such that
s̃0 = A01, in particular, s̃′ = (A01, A12, s̃2, A31, A41) ∈ BR1(t̃). And there exists ŝ ∈ BR1(t̂)
such that ŝ0 = A02, in particular, ŝ′ = (A02, A12, A22, ŝ3, A41) ∈ BR1(t̂).
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Form t̃′ = (B02 , t̂1, t̃2, t̂3, t̃4) and t̂′ = (B01 , t̂1, t̃2, t̂3, t̃4). Thus BR1(t̃′) = BR1(t̃) and






3, A41) ∈ BR1(t̃′) = BR1(t̃) and s̃′ ∧ ŝ′ = (A01, A12, s̃2, A31, A41) ∈ BR1(t̂′) =
BR1(t̂). Thus A41 ∈ BR4,1(t̃4) and A12 ∈ BR1,1(t̂1). Lemma 5(2) implies A42 ∈ BR4,1(t̃4),
thus S ⊆ BR1(t̃). Similarly, as A11 ∈ BR1,1(t̂1), S ⊆ BR1(t̂).
Since S ∩BR1(t̃) 6= ∅ and S ∩BR1(t̃) 6= ∅, Lemma 5 implies A21, A22 ∈ BR2,1(t̃). Thus
S ⊆ BR1(t̃). So S = BR1(t̃). Similarly, S = BR1(t̂).
ii. It is implied by Lemma 4 and Corollary 1.
Lemma 7. Suppose player 1 exhibits strategic complements. For all t ∈ T and s ∈ BR1(t)
such that subgame n is reached on the path of (s, t),
(1). If An2 weakly dominates An1 at Bn1 , then An2 weakly dominates An1 .
(2). If An1 weakly dominates An2 at Bn2 , then An1 weakly dominates An2 .
Proof. (1). Since s ∈ BR1(t) and subgame n is reached on the path of (s, t), An2 ∈
BRn,1(Bn1 ). Pick arbitrary sn ∈ BRn,1(Bn2 ). As player 1 has strategic complements in
subgame n and Bn1 ≺ Bn2 , An2 ∈ BRn,1(Bn2 ).
(2). Proved Similarly as (1).
Lemma 8 is the additional best response structure inherited from two-stage game
structure only.
Lemma 8. Suppose player 1 has strategic complements, if subgame 2 can be reached on
the best response path of some t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B42}, and subgame 4 can
be reached on the best response paths of some t̂ ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B42} and
t̃ ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B41}, then
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i. player 1 is indifferent between A21, A22 and A42
ii. A21, A22 and A42 weakly dominate A41.
Proof. Since t̂2 ≺ t2 and t̂4 ≺ t4, Lemma 4 implies subgame 2 can be reached on the
best response path of t̂ and subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths of t.
Lemma 5 implies that a21 = a23 = a44 ≥ a42 and a22 = a24 = a44 ≥ a42. Thus a21 = a23 = a22 =
a24 = a
4





3 ≥ a41. Thus a21 = a23 = a22 = a24 = a44 = a43 ≥ max{a42, a41}. Thus i and ii are
proved.
Corollary 3. Suppose player 1 has strategic complements, if subgame 4 can be reached
on the best response path of some t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B41}, and subgame 2
can be reached on the best response paths of some t̂ ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B42} and
t̃ ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B41}, then
i. player 1 is indifferent between A21, A22 and A42
ii. A21, A22 and A42 weakly dominate A41.
Corollary 4. If both subgame 1 and 3 can be reached on the best response path for all t
in T\{t ∈ T | t1 = B11 , t3 = B31}, then both subgames can be reached on the best response
path for all t in T . Similarly for all t ∈ T\{t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32}.
Now let’s study exactly under what conditions the 2-stage 2 × 2 game can exhibit
strategic complements.
Case 1: Suppose only subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to all























And between subgame 2 and 4 
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Figure 5: Case 1
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i. if only subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to all t ∈ T , then
Lemma 5 indicates that A42 weakly dominates A41 and strongly dominates A21 and A22.
ii. if only subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths to all t ∈ T , then
Lemma 5 indicates that A22 weakly dominates A21 and strongly dominates A41 and A42.
iii. if subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T and subgame
4 can be reached on the best response paths to some other t̂ ∈ T but never at the same
time. Lemma 4 indicates that all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B41}, only subgame 2 can
be reached on the best response path and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B42}, only
subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths. Lemma 5 implies that player 1
is indifferent between A21 and A22 at B21 . And A21 and A22 at B21 strongly dominates A41
and A42 at B41 . Lemma 5 also implies that A42 weakly dominates A41 at B42 and strongly
dominates A21 and A22 at B22 .
iv. if both subgame 2 and 4 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T ,
then Lemma 4 indicates that for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B41}, subgame 2 can be
reached on the best response path and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B42}, subgame 4
can be reached on the best response paths. Lemma 5 implies that player 1 is indifferent
between A21 and A22 at B21 . And A21 and A22 at B21 weakly dominates A41 and A42 at B41 .
Lemma 5 also implies that A42 weakly dominates A41 at B42 and weakly dominates A21 and
A22 at B22 . If subgame 2 is reached on the path, player 1 is indifferent among A21 and A22.
Similarly, if subgame 4 is reached on the best response paths, A42 weakly dominates A41.
Lemma 7 restricts payoffs within subgames to ensure strategic complements in sub-
games. The possible payoff assignments of Case 1 are included in Table 1.
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Case 2. Suppose only subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths to some
t ∈ T and only subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths to all t ∈ T . Lemma
5 indicates A42 weakly dominates A41 and strongly dominates A21 and A22.
B.  
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Table 1: Case 2
i. if only subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths to all t ∈ T , then
Corollary 2 indicates A31 weakly dominates A32 and strongly dominates A11 and A12.
ii. if subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T and subgame
3 can be reached on the best response paths to some other t̂ ∈ T , but never at the same
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time. Corollary 1 indicates that all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B11 , t3 = B31}, only subgame 1 can
be reached on the best response path and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32}, only
subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths. Corollary 2 implies that player
1 is indifferent between A31 and A32 at B32 . And A31 and A32 at B32 strongly dominates A11
and A12 at B12 . Lemma 5 also implies that A11 weakly dominates A12 at B11 and strongly
dominates A31 and A32 at B31 .
iii. if both subgame 1 and 3 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T ,
then Corollary 1 indicates that for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B11 , t3 = B11}, subgame 1 can
be reached on the best response path and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32}, only
subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths. Corollary 2 implies that player
1 is indifferent between A31 and A32 at B32 . And A31 and A32 at B32 strongly dominates A11
and A12 at B12 . Corollary 2 also implies that A11 weakly dominates A12 at B11 and weakly
dominates A31 and A32 at B31 . Moreover, if subgame 3 is reached on the best response path
to some t ∈ T , player 1 is indifferent among A31 and A32 at t3. Similarly, if subgame 1 is
reached on the best response paths at some t ∈ T , A11 weakly dominates A12 at t1.
Lemma 7 restricts payoffs within subgames to ensure strategic complements in sub-
games. The possible payoff assignments of Case 2 are included in Table 2.
Case 3. Suppose subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths to some t ∈ T ,
for all of those t, subgame 1 can also be reached on the best response paths.
i. if only subgame 4 can be reached on the best response paths for all t ∈ T , thus
Lemma 5 indicates that A22 weakly dominates A21 and strongly dominates A41 and A42.
Corollary 1 indicates that for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32}, both subgame 1 and
subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B11 , t3 =
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C. 
(c1) Between subgame 2 and 4:  
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Table 2: Case 3
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B31}, subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths. One immediate result obtained
from Corollary 2 is that A11 weakly dominates A12, A31 and A32. The dominance between
A11 and A31, A32 can be strict if only subgame 1 can be reached on the best response path.
Corollary 2 also implies that player 1 is indifferent among A31 and A32 at B32 and A11 at B12 .
ii. if subgame 2 can be reached on the best response paths for some t ∈ T , then
Lemma 4 indicates that for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B21 , t4 = B41}, subgame 2 can be reached
on the best response path and for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t2 = B22 , t4 = B42}, subgame 4 can
be reached on the best response paths. Lemma 5 implies that player 1 is indifferent
between A21 and A22 at B21 . And A21 and A22 at B21 weakly dominates A41 and A42 at B41 .
Lemma 5 also implies that A42 weakly dominates A41 at B42 and weakly dominates A21
and A22 at B22 . The dominance can be strict, if only one subgame is reached on the best
response paths. In that case, if subgame 2 is reached on the path, player 1 is indifferent
among A21 and A22. Similarly, if subgame 4 is reached on the best response paths, A42
weakly dominates A41. Corollary 1 indicates that for all t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B12 , t3 = B32},
both subgame 1 and subgame 3 can be reached on the best response paths and for all
t ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = B11 , t3 = B31}, subgame 1 can be reached on the best response paths.
One immediate result obtained from Corollary 2 is that A11 weakly dominates A12, A31 and
A32. The dominance between A11 and A31, A32 can be strict if only subgame 1 can be reached
on the best response path. Corollary 2 also implies that player 1 is indifferent among A31
and A32 at B32 and A11 at B12 .
Lemma 7 restricts payoffs within subgames to ensure strategic complements in sub-
games. The possible payoff assignments of Case 3 are included in Table 3.
We can also show that with the payoff assignments, the two-stage game exhibits strate-
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gic complements. For example,
Suppose Case 1 holds. For every t ∈ T , BR1(t) = {(A01, ŝ1, s2, s3, s4)| ŝ1 ∈ BR11(t1), sn ∈
{An1 , An2}, n ∈ {2, 3, 4}} and BR1,1(t1) is increasing in strong set order with respect to
t1 ∈ {B11 , B12}. Thus for every t, t′ ∈ T , if t1 = t′1 then BR1(t) = BR1(t′) and if t1 ≺ t′1
then BR1(t) v BR1(t′).
In i, for all t ∈ T , BR1(t) = {(A02, s1, s2, s3, ŝ4)| ŝ4 ∈ BR4,1(t
4
), sn ∈ {An1 , An2}, n ∈
{1, 2, 3}} and BR4,1(t4) is increasing in strong set order with respect to t4 ∈ {B41 , B42}.
Thus for every t, t′ ∈ T , if t4 = t′4 then BR1(t) = BR1(t′) and if t4 ≺ t′4 then BR1(t) v
BR1(t
′
). For arbitrary t ∈ T and t ∈ T , BR1(t) ⊂ S and BR1(t) ⊂ S and since
A11 ∈ BR1,1(t1) for t1 ∈ {B11 , B12} and A42 ∈ BR4,1(t4) for t4 ∈ {B41 , B42}, BR1(t) v BR1(t).
Thus player 1 exhibits strategic complements.
All the other cases can be analysed in the same way.
2.3 Compare with Previous Work
In Echenique (2004), an extensive form game with strategic complementarities is defined
as a game with payoffs that satisfies quasi-supermodularity conditions and single crossing
conditions in all the subgames.
The payoff function Ui(s, t) : S × T → R is quasisupermodular if for all t ∈ T and
for any s, s′ ∈ S, u(s∧ s′, t) < u(s, t) implies u(s′, t) < u(s∨ s′, t) and u(s∧ s′, t) ≤ u(s, t)
implies u(s′, t) ≤ u(s ∨ s′, t). The definition is equivalent to u(s′, t) ≥ u(s ∨ s′, t) implies
u(s ∧ s′, t) ≥ u(s, t) and u(s′, t) > u(s ∨ s′, t) implies u(s ∧ s′, t) > u(s, t).
Claim 1. Suppose U1(s, t) is quasisupermodular, then A11, A21, A32 and A42 are weakly
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dominant strategy in subgame 1, subgame 2, subgame 3 and subgame 4 respectively.
Proof. Pick arbitrary s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that s3 = s3, s1 = A11 and s1 6= s1 and pick
arbitrary t, t′ ∈ T such that t3 = t′3, t1 = B11 and t′1 6= t1.
U1(s, t) = U1(s∨ s, t) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s∧ s, t) ≥ U1(s, t), that is,
a11 ≥ a13. Similarly, U1(s, t′) = U1(s∨s, t′) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s∧s, t′) ≥
U1(s, t
′), that is, a12 ≥ a14. Whenever subgame 1 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile
(s, t), A11 offers higher payoff to player 1 in subgame 1. Thus A11 is a weakly dominant
strategy in subgame 1.
Pick arbitrary s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that s4 = s4, s2 = A21 and s2 6= s2 and pick
arbitrary t, t′ ∈ T such that t4 = t′4, t2 = B21 and t
′2 6= t2.
U1(s, t) = U1(s∨ s, t) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s∧ s, t) ≥ U1(s, t), that is,
a21 ≥ a23. Similarly, U1(s, t
′
) = U1(s∨s, t
′





), that is, a22 ≥ a24. Whenever subgame 2 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile
(s, t), A21 offers higher payoff to player 1 in subgame 1. Thus A21 is a weakly dominant
strategy in subgame 2.
Pick arbitrary s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that s1 = s1, s3 = A31 and s3 6= s3 and pick
arbitrary t, t′ ∈ T such that t1 = t′1, t3 = B31 and t′3 6= t3.
U1(s∧ s, t) = U1(s, t) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s, t) ≤ U1(s∨ s, t), that is,
a31 ≤ a33. Similarly, U1(s ∧ s, t′) = U1(s, t′) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s, t′) ≤
U1(s ∨ s, t′), that is, a32 ≤ a34. Whenever subgame 3 is reached on the path if arbitrary
profile (s, t), A32 offers higher payoff to player 1 in subgame 3. Thus A32 is a weakly
dominant strategy in subgame 3.
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Pick arbitrary s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that s2 = s2, s4 = A41 and s4 6= s4 and pick
arbitrary t, t′ ∈ T such that t2 = t′2, t4 = B41 and t
′4 6= t4.
U1(s∧ s, t) = U1(s, t) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s, t) ≤ U1(s∨ s, t), that is,
a41 ≤ a43. Similarly, U1(s ∧ s, t
′
) = U1(s, t
′
) and quasisupermodularity implies U1(s, t
′
) ≤
U1(s ∨ s, t
′
), that is, a42 ≤ a44. Whenever subgame 4 is reached on the path if arbitrary
profile (s, t), A42 offers higher payoff to player 1 in subgame 4. Thus A42 is a weakly
dominant strategy in subgame 4.
The payoff function Ui(s, t) : S × T → R satisfies single crossing condition if for
all t, t′ ∈ T such that t ≺ t′ and for all s, s′ ∈ S such that s ≺ s′, u(s, t) < u(s′, t)
implies u(s, t′) < u(s′, t′) and u(s, t) ≤ u(s′, t) implies u(s, t′) ≤ u(s′, t′). The definition
is equivalent to u(s, t′) ≥ u(s′, t′) implies u(s, t) ≥ u(s′, t) and u(s, t′) > u(s′, t′) implies
u(s, t) > u(s′, t).
Claim 2. Suppose U1(s, t) satisfies single crossing condition, the A11, A22, A31 and A42 are
weakly dominant strategy in subgame 1, subgame 2, subgame 3 and subgame 4 respectively.
Proof. Pick arbitrary s, s′ ∈ S such that s4 = s′4, s3 = A31 and s′3 = A32. And pick
arbitrary t ∈ T and t ∈ T such that t3 = t3.
U1(s∧ s′, t∨ t) = U1(s′, t∨ t) and single crossing condition implies that U1(s∧ s′, t) ≥
U1(s
′, t), in particular, t3 = B31 implies a31 ≥ a33 and t3 = B32 implies a32 ≥ a34. Thus
whenever subgame 3 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile (s, t), A31 offers higher
payoff to player 1 in subgame 3. Thus A31 is a weakly dominant strategy in subgame 3.
Pick arbitrary s, s′ ∈ S such that s3 = s′3, s4 = A41 and s′4 = A42. And pick arbitrary
t ∈ T and t ∈ T such that t4 = t4.
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U1(s∧ s′, t∧ t) = U1(s′, t∧ t) and single crossing condition implies that U1(s∧ s′, t) ≥
U1(s
′, t), in particular, t4 = B41 implies a41 ≤ a43 and t
4
= B42 implies a42 ≤ a44. Thus
whenever subgame 4 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile (s, t), A42 offers higher
payoff to player 1 in subgame 4. Thus A42 is a weakly dominant strategy in subgame 4.
Pick arbitrary s, s′ ∈ S such that s2 = s′2, s1 = A11 and s′1 = A12. And pick arbitrary
t ∈ T and t ∈ T such that t1 = t1.
U1(s∧ s′, t∨ t) = U1(s′, t∨ t) and single crossing condition implies that U1(s∧ s′, t) ≥
U1(s
′, t), in particular, t1 = B11 implies a11 ≥ a13 and t1 = B12 implies a12 ≥ a14. Thus
whenever subgame 1 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile (s, t), A11 offers higher
payoff to player 1 in subgame 1. Thus A11 is a weakly dominant strategy in subgame 1.
Pick arbitrary s, s′ ∈ S such that s1 = s′1, s2 = A21 and s′2 = A22. And pick arbitrary
t ∈ T and t ∈ T such that t2 = t2.
U1(s∧ s′, t∧ t) = U1(s′, t∧ t) and single crossing condition implies that U1(s∧ s′, t) ≤
U1(s
′, t), in particular, t2 = B21 implies a21 ≤ a23 and t
2
= B22 implies a22 ≤ a24. Thus
whenever subgame 2 is reached on the path if arbitrary profile (s, t), A22 offers higher
payoff to player 1 in subgame 2. Thus A22 is a weakly dominant strategy in subgame 2.
Claim 3. Under differential payoff to outcomes assumption, the set of two-stage game
with strategic complementarities has measure zero.
Proof. Quasisupermodularity condition requires A21 to be weakly dominant in subgame
2 and A32 to be weakly dominant in subgame 3. Single crossing condition requires A22 to
be weakly dominant in subgame 2 and A31 to be weakly dominant in subgame 3. Thus
an1 = a
n
3 and an2 = an4 must be true for n ∈ {2, 3}. Contradiction to the assumption on
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payoff.
Claim 4. If there exist t ∈ T such that there exists s ∈ S and s ∈ S and U1(s, t) < U1(s, t),
then for all t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S, U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), that is, max{a21, a22, a23, a24} <
min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Proof. Lemma 4 indicates that for every s′ ∈ {s ∈ S| s1 = s1}, s′ ∈ {s ∈ S| s3 = s3}
and t′ ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = t1 and t3 = t3}, U1(s′, t′) < U1(s′, t′).
Let t̂ = (B01 , t1, B21 , t
3
, B41), pick arbitrary t̃ ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = t1 and t3 = t3}, ŝ ∈ {s ∈
S| s1 = s1 and s3 = s3} and s̃ ∈ {s ∈ S| s1 = s1, s3 = s3, s2  ŝ2, s4  ŝ4}. Thus t̃  t̂
and s̃  ŝ. Since U1(ŝ, t̂) < U1(s̃, t̂), single crossing condition implies U1(ŝ, t̃) < U1(s̃, t̃).
Thus it is easy to see that all payoffs in subgame 2 is lower than payoffs in subgame 4,
that is, max{a21, a22, a23, a24} < min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Claim 5. If there exists t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t). Then the
following must be true:
a If s1 = A11, t1 = B11 , then max{a11, a12, a13, a14} < U1(s, t).
b If s1 = A11, t1 = B12 , then max{a12, a14} < U1(s, t).
c If s1 = A12, t1 = B11 , then max{a13, a14} < U1(s, t).
d If s1 = A12, t1 = B12 , then a14 < U1(s, t).
m If t3 = B31 , then U1(s, t) < min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34}.
n If t3 = B32 , then U1(t, t) < a32 = a34.
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Proof. (a). Form t′ = (B01 , B12 , t2, t3, t4), thus t′  t. Single crossing conditions require
that as U1(s, t) = a11 < U1(s, t), U1(s, t′) = a12 < U1(s, t′). As t′3 = t3, U1(s, t′) = U1(s, t).
Thus a12 < U1(s, t). Since A11 is weakly dominant in subgame 1, a11 ≥ a13 and a12 ≥ a14.
Thus max{a11, a12, a13, a14} < U1(s, t).
(b). Follow directly from the assumption and A11 is weakly dominant in subgame 1.
(c). Form t′ = (B01 , B12 , t2, t3, t4), thus t′  t. Single crossing conditions require that
as U1(s, t) = a13 < U1(s, t), U1(s, t′) = a14 < U1(s, t′). As t′3 = t3, U1(s, t′) = U1(s, t). Thus
a14 < U1(s, t).
(d). Follow directly from the assumption.
(m). Form t′ = (B01 , t1, t2, B32 , t4), thus t′  t. Single crossing conditions require that
as U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), U1(s, t′) < U1(s, t′), since A31 and A32 are both weakly dominant
strategy in subgame 3, U1(s, t) < a31 = a33 and U1(s, t) < a32 = a34.
(n). Directly follow the assumption and a32 = a34.
It is easy to see that if (a) is satisfied then (b), (c) and (d) are satisfied and moreover,
both (b) and (c) imply (d). Also if (m) is satisfied, then (n) is satisfied automatically.
Now consider that there exists t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t),
then Claim (4) indicates that max{a21, a22, a23, a24} < min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Case 1: there exists t ∈ T such that a11 < U1(s, t). Since (a) implies (b), (c) and (d),
max{a12, a13, a14} < U1(s, t).
1. If there exists t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 and s ∈ S with s1 = A11 such







2. If a11 ≥ a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32 and s ∈ S with
s1 = A11 such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (a) and (n) implies a32 = a34 > a11 ≥ a31 =
a33 and max{a11, a12, a13, a14} < a32 = a34. Thus (b), (c) and (d) must be satisfied with
(n).
(a) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11, t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such that
U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (b) and (m) implies a32 = a34 > a11 ≥ a31 = a33 > a12 ≥ a14.
i. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12, t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (m) implies a32 = a34 > a11 ≥ a31 =
a33 > max{a13, a12 ≥ a14}
ii. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12, t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32 such




(b) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (b) and (n) implies a32 = a34 > max{a11, a12} ≥
min{a11, a12} ≥ a31 = a33
i. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (m) implies a32 = a34 > max{a11, a12} >
min{a11, a12} ≥ a31 = a33 > max{a13, a14}
ii. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32
such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (n) implies a32 = a34 > a11 ≥
max{a13, a12} ≥ min{a13, a12} ≥ a31 = a33
36
A. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31
such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (d) and (m) implies a32 = a34 > a11 ≥
max{a13, a12} ≥ min{a13, a12} ≥ a31 = a33 > a14
B. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and





1 ≥ max{a13, a12 ≥ a14} ≥ min{a13, a12 ≥ a14} ≥ a31 = a33
Payoff assignments in Case 1 are summarized as (1). max{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} <





1 ≥ a13 ≥ a31 = a33 > a12 ≥ a14; (4). a32 = a34 > max{a11, a12} ≥ min{a11, a12} ≥
a31 = a
3
3 > max{a13, a14}; (5). a32 = a34 > a11 ≥ max{a13, a12} ≥ min{a13, a12} ≥ a31 = a33 > a14
and (6). a32 = a34 > a11 ≥ max{a13, a12 ≥ a14} ≥ min{a13, a12 ≥ a14} ≥ a31 = a33.
Case 2: a11 ≥ max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t, t′ ∈ T such that a12 < U1(s, t)
and a13 < U1(s, t′). Since both (b) and (c) imply (d), a14 < min{U1(s, t), U1(s, t′)}.
1. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such that
U1(s, t) < U1(s, t) , then (b) and (m) implies that a11 ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} ≥
min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > a12 ≥ a14
(a) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t) , then (c) and (m) implies that a11 ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 =
a34} ≥ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > max{a13, a12 ≥ a14}
(b) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32 such







2. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such that
U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (b) and (n) implies that a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 > a31 = a33.
(a) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (m) implies that a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 >
a31 = a
3
3 > max{a13, a14}.
(b) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32
such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (n) implies that a11 ≥ a32 = a34 >
max{a12, a13} ≥ min{a12, a13} > a31 = a33.
i. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31
such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (m) and (d) implies that a11 ≥ a32 = a34 >
max{a12, a13} ≥ min{a12, a13} > a31 = a33 > a14.
ii. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32
such that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (n) and (d) implies that a11 ≥ a32 = a34 >
max{a12 ≥ a14, a13} ≥ min{a12 ≥ a14, a13} > a31 = a33.
Payoff assignments in Case 2 are summarized as (1). a11 ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} ≥
min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > max{a13, a12 ≥ a14}; (2). a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > a13 > a31 = a33 > a12 ≥ a14;
(3). a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 > a31 = a33 > max{a13, a14}; (4). a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > max{a12, a13} ≥
min{a12, a13} > a31 = a33 > a14 and (5). a11 ≥ a32 = a34 > max{a12 ≥ a14, a13} ≥ min{a12 ≥
a14, a
1
3} > a31 = a33.
Case 3: a11 ≥ a13 ≥ max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a12 < U1(s, t).
Since (b) implies (d), a14 < U1(s, t).
1. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such that
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U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (b) and (m) implies that a11 ≥ a13 ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 =
a34} ≥ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > a12 ≥ a14,
2. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A11 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such that
U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (b) and (n) implies that a11 ≥ a13 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 > a31 = a33.
(a) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such








(b) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (n) and (d) implies that a11 ≥ a13 ≥ a32 = a34 >
a12 ≥ a14 > a31 = a33
Payoff assignments in Case 3 are summarized as (1). a11 ≥ a13 ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 =
a34} ≥ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > a12 ≥ a14; (2). a11 ≥ a13 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 > a31 = a33 > a14 and
(3). a11 ≥ a13 ≥ a32 = a34 > a12 ≥ a14 > a31 = a33.
Case 4: min{a11, a12} ≥ max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a13 <
U1(s, t). Since (c) implies (d), a14 < U1(s, t) .
1. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B31 such that
U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (c) and (m) implies that min{a11, a12} ≥ max{a31 = a33, a32 =
a34} ≥ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > max{a13, a14}
2. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B11 and t3 = B32 such that





(a) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such










(b) If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such
that U1(s, t) < U1(s, t), then (n) and (d) implies that min{a11, a12} ≥ a32 =
a34 > max{a13, a14} >= min{a13, a14} > a31 = a33
















Case 5: min{a11, a12, a13} ≥ max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a14 <
U1(s, t).
1. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B31 such that





4} ≥ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} > a14.
2. If there exists s ∈ S with s1 = A12 and t ∈ T with t1 = B12 and t3 = B32 such that


















Claim 6. If for every s ∈ S, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , U1(s, t) ≥ U1(s, t) and there exists t̂ ∈ T ,
ŝ ∈ S and s̃ ∈ S such that U1(ŝ, t̂) = U1(s̃, t̂), then for every s ∈ S, s ∈ S and t ∈ T ,
U1(s, t) ≤ U1(s, t), that is, max{a21, a22, a23, a24} ≤ min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Proof. Similar as Claim 4, Lemma 4 indicates that for every s′ ∈ {s ∈ S| s1 = s1},
s′ ∈ {s ∈ S| s3 = s3} and t′ ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = t1 and t3 = t3}, U1(s′, t′) = U1(s′, t′).
Let t̂ = (B01 , t1, B21 , t
3
, B41), pick arbitrary t̃ ∈ {t ∈ T | t1 = t1 and t3 = t3}, ŝ ∈ {s ∈
S| s1 = s1 and s3 = s3} and s̃ ∈ {s ∈ S| s1 = s1, s3 = s3, s2  ŝ2, s4  ŝ4}. Thus t̃  t̂
and s̃  ŝ. Since U1(ŝ, t̂) = U1(s̃, t̂), single crossing condition implies U1(ŝ, t̃) ≤ U1(s̃, t̃).
Thus it is easy to see that all payoffs in subgame 2 is no higher than payoffs in subgame
4, that is, max{a21, a22, a23, a24} ≤ min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Claim 7. If there exists t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that U1(s, t) = U1(s, t). Then the
following must be true:
a′ If s1 = A11, t1 = B11 , then max{a11, a12, a13, a14} ≤ U1(s, t).
b′ If s1 = A11, t1 = B12 , then max{a12, a14} ≤ U1(s, t).
c′ If s1 = A12, t1 = B11 , then max{a13, a14} ≤ U1(s, t).
d′ If s1 = A12, t1 = B12 , then a14 = U1(s, t).
m′ If t3 = B31 , then U1(s, t) ≤ min{a31 = a33, a32 = a34}.
n′ If t3 = B32 , then U1(t, t) ≤ a32 = a34.
Proof. Proved similarly as Claim 5.
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Now consider the scenario that for every s ∈ S, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , U1(s, t) ≥ U1(s, t)
and there exists t̂ ∈ T , ŝ ∈ S and s̃ ∈ S such that U1(ŝ, t̂) = U1(s̃, t̂). Claim 6 indicates
that max{a21, a22, a23, a24} ≤ min{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
Case 1′: there exists t ∈ T such that a11 = U1(s, t). Since (a) implies (b), (c) and (d),
max{a12, a13, a14} ≤ U1(s, t).
















2. If a11 > a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B32 such that a11 = U1(s, t), then
(a′) and (n′) imply a32 = a34 = a11 = a12 = a13 = a14 > a31 = a33
Payoff assignments in case 1′ are summarized as a32 = a34 = a11 = a12 = a13 = a14 ≥ a31 = a33.
Case 2′: a11 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a12 = U1(s, t).













4. If a13 = a14, then a11 > a13 = a12 = a14 = a31 = a33 =
a32 = a
3
4 and if a13 > a14 then a11 ≥ a13 > a12 = a14 = a31 = a33 = a32 = a34
2. If a12 > a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B32 such that a12 = U1(s, t), then (a′)









3 and if a13 > a14, then a11 ≥ a13 > a32 = a34 = a12 = a14 > a31 = a33
Payoff assignments in case 2′ are summarized as a11 > a32 = a34 = a12 = a14 = a13 ≥ a31 = a33
and a11 ≥ a13 > a32 = a34 = a12 = a14 ≥ a31 = a33.
Case 3′: a11, a12 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a13 = U1(s, t).
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1. If there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B31 such that a13 = U1(s, t), then (c′) and (m′) imply
min{a11, a12} > a13 = a14 = a31 = a33 = a32 = a34.
2. If a13 > a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B32 such that a13 = U1(s, t), then
(c′) and (n′) imply min{a11, a12} > a13 = a14 = a32 = a34 > a31 = a33
Payoff assignments in case 3′ are summarized as min{a11, a12} > a13 = a14 = a32 = a34 ≥ a31 =
a33.
Case 4′: a11, a13 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a12 = U1(s, t).
1. If there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B31 such that a12 = U1(s, t), then (b′) and (m′) imply
a11 ≥ a13 > a12 = a14 = a31 = a33 = a32 = a34.
2. If a12 > a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B32 such that a12 = U1(s, t), then
(b′) and (n′) imply a11 ≥ a13 > a12 = a14 = a32 = a34 > a31 = a33.
Payoff assignments in case 4′ are summarized as a11 ≥ a13 > a12 = a14 = a32 = a34 ≥ a31 = a33.
Case 5′: a11, a12, a13 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and there exists t ∈ T such that a14 = U1(s, t).
1. If there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B31 such that a14 = U1(s, t), then (d′) and (m′) imply
min{a11 ≥ a13, a12} > a14 = a31 = a33 = a32 = a34.
2. If a14 > a31 = a33 and there exists t ∈ T with t3 = B32 such that a14 = U1(s, t), then
(d′) and (n′) imply min{a11 ≥ a13, a12} > a14 = a32 = a34 > a31 = a33.
Payoff assignments in case 5′ are summarized as min{a11 ≥ a13, a12} > a14 = a32 = a34 ≥ a31 =
a33.
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Claim 8. If there exist t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that U1(s, t) > U1(s, t), then for
every t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S, U1(s, t) > U1(s, t), that is, min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a24} >
max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34}.
Proof. Proved similarly as in Claim 4.
Now consider the scenario that there exists t ∈ T , s ∈ S and s ∈ S such that U1(s, t) >
U1(s, t), then Claim (7) indicates that min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a24} > max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34}.
Case 6: Suppose there exists t ∈ T such that a44 < U1(s, t), payoff assignments are
summarized as (1). max{a43 ≥ a41, a44 ≥ a42} < min{a21 = a23, a22 = a24}; (2). a21 =
a23 > a
4
4 ≥ a22 = a24 > max{a42, a43 ≥ a41}; (3). a21 = a23 > a44 ≥ a42 ≥ a22 = a24 >
a43 ≥ a41; (4). a21 = a23 > max{a44, a43} ≥ min{a44, a43} ≥ a22 = a24 > max{a41, a42};
(5). a21 = a23 > max{a44 ≥ a42, a43} ≥ min{a44 ≥ a42, a43} ≥ a22 = a24 > a41 and (6).
a21 = a
2
3 > max{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41} ≥ min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41} ≥ a22 = a24.
Case 7: Suppose a44 ≥ max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t, t
′ ∈ T such that a43 <
U1(s, t) and a42 < U1(s, t
′












3 ≥ a41; (3). a44 ≥ a21 = a23 > a43 > a22 = a24 > max{a41, a42}; (4).
a44 ≥ a21 = a23 > max{a43, a42} ≥ min{a43, a42} > a22 = a24 > a41 and (5). a44 ≥ a21 = a23 >
max{a43 ≥ a41, a42} ≥ min{a43 ≥ a41, a42} > a22 = a24.
Case 8: Suppose a44 ≥ a42 ≥ max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that
a43 < U1(s, t), payoff assignments are summarized as (1). a44 ≥ a42 ≥ max{a21 = a23, a22 =
a24} ≥ min{a21 = a23, a22 = a24} > a43 ≥ a41; (2). a44 ≥ a42 ≥ a21 = a23 > a43 > a22 = a24 > a41 and
(3). a44 ≥ a42 ≥ a21 = a23 > a43 ≥ a41 > a22 = a24.
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Case 9: Suppose min{a44, a43} ≥ max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that
















Case 10: Suppose min{a44, a43, a42} ≥ max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such
that a41 < U1(s, t), payoff assignments are summarized as (1). min{a44 ≥ a42, a43} ≥










Claim 9. If for every s ∈ S, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , U1(s, t) ≤ U1(s, t) and there ex-
ists t̂ ∈ T , ŝ ∈ S and s̃ ∈ S such that U1(ŝ, t̂) = U1(s̃, t̂), then min{a11, a12, a13, a14} ≥
max{a31, a32, a33, a34}.
Proof. Proved similarly as in Claim 6.
Now consider the scenario that every s ∈ S, s ∈ S and t ∈ T , U1(s, t) ≤ U1(s, t) and
there exists t̂ ∈ T , ŝ ∈ S and s̃ ∈ S such that U1(ŝ, t̂) = U1(s̃, t̂).
Case 6′: There exists t ∈ T such that a44 = U1(s, t). Payoff assignments are summarized
as a21 = a23 = a41 = a42 = a43 = a44 ≥ a22 = a24.
Case 7′: a44 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that a43 = U1(s, t).
Payoff assignments are summarized as a44 > a21 = a23 = a43 = a41 = a42 ≥ a22 = a24 and
a44 ≥ a42 > a21 = a23 = a43 = a41 ≥ a22 = a24.
Case 8′: a44, a43 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that a42 = U1(s, t).
Payoff assignments are summarized as min{a44, a43} > a42 = a41 = a21 = a23 ≥ a22 = a24.
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Case 9′: a44, a42 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that a43 = U1(s, t).
Payoff assignments are summarized as a44 ≥ a42 > a43 = a41 = a21 = a23 ≥ a22 = a24.
Case 10′: a44, a43, a42 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24} and there exists t ∈ T such that a41 = U1(s, t).
Payoff assignments are summarized as min{a44 ≥ a42, a43} > a41 = a21 = a23 ≥ a22 = a24.
Claim 10. The two-stage game is extensive form game with strategic complementarities
if one of the following is true:
1. Between subgame 1 and 3 are payoffs in Case 1 − 5 and between subgame 2 and 4
is max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41}
2. Between subgame 1 and 3 are payoffs in Case 1′ − 5′ and min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} >
max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} and between subgame 2 and 4 are payoffs in Case 6′ − 10′
and max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41}
3. Between subgame 1 and 3 is min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} > max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} and
between subgame 2 and 4 are payoffs from Case 6− 10
Proof. 1. Claim 4 indicates that if payoff are from Case 1− 5, then max{a22 = a23, a22 =
a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41}. And max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41}
allows Case 1− 5 to be satisfied under quasisupermodular and single crossing conditions.
2. If payoff are from Case 1′ − 5′, then Claim 6 indicates that max{a22 = a23, a22 =
a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41} and moreover, under quasisupermodular and single crossing
conditions requires payoff from Case 6′ − 10′ or max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥
a42, a
4
3 ≥ a41} to be satisfied. And if payoff are from Case 6′ − 10′, the Claim 9 indicates
payoffs from Case 1′ − 5′ and min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} > max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} to be
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satisfied. min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} > max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} allows Case 6′ − 10′ and
max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41} to be satisfied under quasisupermodular
and single crossing conditions. And max{a22 = a23, a22 = a24} < min{a44 ≥ a42, a43 ≥ a41}
allows Case 1′ − 5′ and min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} > max{a31 = a33, a32 = a34} to be satisfied
under quasisupermodular and single crossing conditions.
3. If payoffs are from Case 6 − 10, then Claim 8 indicates min{a11 ≥ a13, a12 ≥ a14} >









3 Two-stage Games and Restricted Strategic Comple-
ments
We can easily observe that for general extensive form games, the dimensions of strategy
space can be huge. This imposes considerable difficulty in analysing strategic complemen-
tarity property directly. However, this paper shows that it is possible to properly reduce
the strategy space to facilitate the process without loosing generality. It is worth noting
that this is a case study focusing on two-stage 2×2 games. So the results are very limited.
Mailath, Samuelson and Swinkels (1993, 1994) established that strategic indepen-
dence, a property of extensive-form games and information sets can be captured in the
reduced normal form. They proved a close relationship between these normal form struc-
tures and their extensive form namesakes. In particular, they developed three types of
the extensive-form presentation of the normal form game. A weak representation can
allow (though never force) a player to make a decision between elements in the normal
form information set while knowing only his opponents have restricted themselves to a
larger set. A strong representation requires that player does not choose between elements
in the normal form information set until the extra information that the opponents have
chosen from their normal-form information set is available. Since there exists satisfactory
non-strong representations, parsimonious representation is introduced as an intermediate
notion of representability that exclude information dominated sequences of actions. In
particular, a weak representation is parsimonious if and only if it has no information dom-
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inance. If a game has a strong representation, then that representation is parsimonious
and any parsimonious representation of the game is also a strong representation. They
have also provided an algorithm that generates a representation whenever one exists. In
this paper, I will implement their method and terminology.
3.1 Motivation
Let’s have another look at the example we showed in Chapter 2. We have showed that
the two-stage game assigned with the corresponding payoffs at terminal nodes is not an
extensive form game with strategic complementarities (Echenique (2004)). However, it
exhibits strategic complements as the best responses sets are increasing in strong set order
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Instead of the normal form of the extensive form and its subgames, we will be looking













































































































































































Figure 7: Reduced Normal Form
The targeted reduced-form strategies {s1(1,2)1 , s
2(1,2)




2 } were selected
to resemble the strictly dominant strategy within subgames in Chapter 2. Single crossing
conditions applied on the targeted reduced form strategies and no single crossing con-
ditions were used to represent the concept of dominant strategies between subgames in
Chapter 2. I showed in Section 3.5 that since the payoff assignments satisfy the conditions,
the corresponding extensive form game exhibits strategic complements.
3.2 Initial Set-up
At each stage t ∈ {1, 2}, a 2-player simultaneous game is played in which player 1 and 2 is





We assume that at, 1i ≺ a
t, 2
i . Payoffs are assigned at terminal nodes. The extensive form






































                  
 











1a   
1
2a   
1
3a    
1
4a    
2
1a   
2
2a   
2
3a   
2
4a   
3
1a    
3
2a   
3
3a   
3
4a   
4
1a   
4
2a   
4
3a    
4
4a   
  11b   
1
2b   
1
3b    
1
3b    
2
1b   
2
2b   
2
3b   
2
4b   
3
1b   
3
2b    
3
3b    
3
4b   
4








      
 h
0 
Figure 8: 2− stage extensive form
in particular, player 1’s set of information sets is H1 and player 2’s set is H2. Actions
available on each information set h is denoted as set A(h). h0 is the initial node. We
assume h0 ∈ H1.
Let h1 denotes player 1’s information set reached right after a1, 11 being played at h0
and a1, 12 being played at h02. Denote player 1’s strategies that allows information set h1
to be reached on the path as SΓ1 (h1), player 2’s strategies that reaches h12 as SΓ2 (h12).
Similarly, let h2 denotes player 1’s information set reached right after a1, 11 being played
at h0 and a1, 22 being played at h02. Denote player 1’s strategies that reaches h2 as SΓ1 (h2),
player 2’s strategies that reaches h22 as SΓ2 (h22).
Let h3 denotes player 1’s information sets reached right after a1, 21 being played at h0
and a1, 12 being played at h02. Denote player 1’s strategies that reaches h3 as SΓ1 (h3), player
2’s strategies that reaches h32 as SΓ2 (h32).
Let h4 denotes player 1’s information sets reached right after a1, 21 being played at h0
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and a1, 22 being played at h02. Denote player 1’s strategies that reaches h4 as SΓ1 (h4), player
2’s strategies that reaches h42 as SΓ2 (h42).
Strategy σ̂1, σ̃1 ∈ SΓ1 are equivalent if for every σ2 ∈ SΓ2 , U1(σ̂1, σ2) = U1(σ̃1, σ2).
The set of all strategies that are equivalent consists of an equivalent class.
First, consider player 1:
Now for arbitrary σ̂1, σ̃1 ∈ {σ1 ∈ SΓ1 | σ1(h0) = a
1, 1
1 , σ1(h
1) = a2, 11 , σ1(h
2) = a2, 11 }
and for arbitrary σ2 ∈ SΓ2 , we have U1(σ̂1, σ2) = U1(σ̃1, σ2). Thus denote s
1(1, 1)
1 as a
representation of the strategies in {σ1 ∈ SΓ1 | σ1(h0) = a
1, 1
1 , σ1(h
1) = a2, 11 , σ1(h
2) = a2, 11 }.
Similarly, strategies in {σ1 ∈ SΓ1 | σ1(h0) = a
1, 1
1 , σ1(h
1) = a2, i1 , σ1(h
2) = a2, j1 },
i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}, yield same payoff with respect to arbitrary player 2’s strategy
σ2 ∈ SΓ2 . And denote s
1(i, j)
1 as a representation of the strategies in {σ1 ∈ SΓ1 | σ1(h0) =
a1, 11 , σ1(h
1) = a2, i1 , σ1(h
2) = a2, j1 }. For arbitrary σ2 ∈ SΓ2 , U1(s
1(i, j)
1 , σ2) = U1(σ̂1, σ2)
with σ̂1 ∈ s1(i, j)1 .





3) = a2, i1 , s
Γ
1 (h
4) = a2, j1 }, i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ {1, 2}, yield same payoff with respect to arbitrary player 2’s strategy sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 . And






a2, i1 , s
Γ
1 (h








2 ) with ŝΓ1 ∈ s
2(i, j)
1 .
Reduced normal form strategy space for player 1 is S1 = {s1(i, j)1 , s
2(i, j)
1 | i, j ∈ {1, 2}}.
The order on the normal-form strategies for player 1 is assigned in the following way:





















































(iii). The orders between elements in S11 and S21 is assigned in the following way: for
arbitrary s1 ∈ S11 and s′1 ∈ S21 , s1 = s1 ∧ s′1 ≺ s1 ∨ s′1 = s′1.




























































Figure 9: order for S1
Now for player 2,
Denote h02 as the information set of player 2 such that SΓ(h0) = SΓ(h02).















and for arbitrary sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 , we have U2(sΓ1 , ŝΓ2 ) = U2(sΓ1 , s̃Γ2 ). Thus denote s
1(1, 1)
2 as a


























i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2}, yield same payoff with respect to arbitrary player 1’s strategy
sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 . And denote s
1(i, j)
2 as a representation of the strategies in {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) =












2 }. For arbitrary sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 , U1(sΓ1 , s
1(i, j)























2 }, i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ {1, 2}, yield same payoff with respect to arbitrary player 1’s strategy sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 . And













2 }. For arbitrary sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 , U1(sΓ1 , s
2(i, j)




2 ) with ŝΓ2 ∈ s
2(i, j)
2 .
Normal for strategy space for player 2 is S2 = {s1(i, j)2 , s
2(i, j)
2 | i, j ∈ {1, 2}}.
The order on the normal-form strategies for player 2 is assigned in the following way:




















































(iii). The orders between elements in S12 and S22 is assigned in the following way: for
arbitrary s2 ∈ S12 and s′2 ∈ S22 , s2 = s2 ∧ s′2 ≺ s2 ∨ s′2 = s′2.




























































Figure 10: order for S2
Figure 10 showed the reduced normal form of the two stage game with the corre-
sponding payoff obtained from the extensive form. In particular, for arbitrary σ1 ∈ SΓ1
and σ2 ∈ SΓ2 , there exists s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2 such that σ1 ∈ s1 and σ2 ∈ s2 and
π(σ1, σ2) = π(s1, s2). Since no strategy si ∈ Si agrees with any element of si\{si} on
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Figure 11: Reduced Normal Form
3.3 Main Results
Lemma 9. Suppose single crossing condition is satisfied on Si1 × S2, then there exists
ŝi1 ∈ Si1 such that for arbitrary s2 ∈ S2 and s1 ∈ Si1, U1(ŝi1, s2) ≥ U1(s1, s2), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. Notice that s1(1, 1)1 ≺ s
1(1, 2)









2 ), single crossing condition implies that U1(s
1(1, 1)
1 , s2) <
U1(s
1(1, 2)
1 , s2) for arbitrary s2 ∈ S2. And for arbitrary s1 ∈ S11 and s2 ∈ S22 , as
U1(s
1(1, 1)
1 , s2) = U1(s
1(2, 1)
1 , s2) and U1(s
1(1, 2)
1 , s2) = U1(s
1(2, 2)
1 , s2), U1(s
1(1, 2)
1 , s2) ≥






















for arbitrary s12 ∈ S12 . For arbitrary s1 ∈ S11 and s2 ∈ S12 , as U1(s
1(1, 2)





1 , s2) = U1(s
1(2, 1)
1 , s2), U1(s
1(1, 2)
1 , s2) > U1(s1, s2). Thus for arbitrary
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s2 ∈ S2 and s′1 ∈ S11 , U1(s
1(1, 2)
1 , s2) ≥ U1(s′1, s2). Similarly, for arbitrary s2 ∈ S2 and
s′1 ∈ S21 , U1(s
2(1, 2)
1 , s2) ≥ U1(s′1, s2).
Let ŝi1 denote the strategy in the reduced strategy space Si1 that is always included in
player 1’s best response set to arbitrary player 2’s strategy in Si1. Lemma 1 showed that
ŝi1 always exists. And in particular, ŝi1 = s
i(1, 2)
1 .
Function U1(s1, s2) : S1 × S2 → R satisfies semi-no crossing conditions between
s1 ∈ S1 and s′1 ∈ S1 at ŝ2 ∈ Si2, i ∈ {1, 2}, if U1(s1, ŝ2) > U1(s′1, ŝ2), then for all s2 ∈ Si2,
U1(s1, s2) > U1(s
′
1, s2).
The reduced normal form game exhibits restricted strategic complements in
player i if player i’s payoff Ui(si, s−i) is quasisupermodular on Si, Ui satisfies single
crossing conditions on S1×S2, and Ui satisfies semi-no crossing conditions between s1(1,2)i
and s2(1,2)i at {infS1i , infS2i }.
Theorem 2. If the reduced normal form game exhibits restricted strategic complements,
then the two-stage game exhibits strategic complements.
Proof. Let’s consider player 1 here. The case for player 2 can be handled in similar ways.
Suppose the reduced normal form game exhibits restricted strategic complements in
player 1, then single crossing conditions on S1 × S2 and semi-no crossing conditions are
satisfied. Lemma 9 indicates that s1(1,2)1 is the optimal in S11 , that is, a11 > a13, a12 > a14,
a23 > a
2
1 and a24 > a22. Similarly, s
2(1,2)
1 is optimal in S21 , that is, a31 > a33, a32 > a34, a43 > a41
and a44 > a42.
If U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , infS2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , infS2), then single crossing conditions on S1 ×
S2 imply that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , s2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2), for all s2 ∈ S2. It is easy to see that
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min{a31, a32} > max{a11, a12} and min{a43, a44} > max{a23, a24}. This result along with
Lemma 9 corresponds to case (3) in Theorem 1 in which A31 dominates A32, A11 and A12, and
A42 dominates A41, A21 and A22. Thus the two-stage game exhibits strategic complements.
Now consider the scenarios that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , infS2) > U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , infS2). Then semi-
no-crossing condition between s1(1,2) and s2(1,2)1 on infS2 indicates that for all s2 ∈ S12 ,
U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , s2) > U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2). Thus min{a11, a12} > max{a31, a32}. Along with Lemma









2), then single crossing conditions on S1 ×
S2 imply that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , s2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2), for all s2 ∈ S22 . Thus min{a43, a44} >
max{a22, a24}. With Lemma 9, A42 dominates A41, A21 and A22. Thus this corresponds to









2), then semi-no-crossing condition between
s1(1,2) and s2(1,2)1 on infS22 indicates that for all s2 ∈ S22 , U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , s2) > U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2).
Thus min{a23, a24} > max{a43, a44}. Along with Lemma 9, A22 dominates A21, A41 and A42.
This corresponds to case (1) in Theorem 1. Thus the two-stage game exhibits strategic
complements.
Theorem 2 indicates that standard ordinal strategic complementarity conditions im-




1 , infS2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , infS2) is satisfied, then single crossing condition im-
posed on S1×S2 alone can generate case (3) in Theorem 1. Similarly, if U1(s1(1,2)1 , supS2) >
U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , supS2), then single crossing condition alone on payoffs indicates case (1).
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But without the semi-no-crossing conditions, standard ordinal strategic complemen-
tarity conditions can also result in cases where strategic complements are violated in the
extensive form.
In the case that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , infS2) > U1(s
2(1,2)









2), single crossing condition can allow the scenario such that there exists
ŝ2 ∈ S12\infS2 and U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , ŝ2) < U1(s
2(1,2)











2 ), that is, a11 < a32, single crossing condition can be supported here. But
an immediate result would be a11 > a31 and a11 < a32, thus both subgame 1 and 3 can be
reached on the best response paths thus violating Lemma 1 which clearly states that only
one subgame can be reached on the best response path whenever opponent’s first stage
action is fixed.
To see why, suppose player 2’s strategy increases from B01 − B11 − (B21) − B31 − (B41)
to B01 − B11 − (B21)− B32 − (B41). a11(> a13) > a31(> a33) indicates that player 1 will choose
A01 then play A11 in subgame 1, in particular, s1 = (A01, A11, A21, A32, A41) is included in the
best response set with respect to B01 − B11 − (B21) − B31 − (B41). a11(> a13) < a32(> a34)
indicates that player 1 will choose A02 then strictly prefer to play A31 in subgame 3 and
indifferent among the choices in other subgames, in particular, ŝ1 = (A02, A11, A21, A31, A41)
is included in the best response set with respect to B01 − B11 − (B21) − B32 − (B41). But
s1 ∨ ŝ1 = (A02, A11, A21, A32, A41) is not a best response to B01 −B11 − (B21)−B32 − (B41), thus
strategic complements is not supported here.
Semi-no crossing condition between s1(1,2)1 and s
2(1,2)
1 on infS12 ensures that such sce-
narios will not arise. And in particular, enables case (2).
Now we move on to find a characterization of strategic complements on two-stage
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games.
Function U1(s1, s2) : S1×S2 → R satisfies no crossing conditions between ŝ1 ∈ Si1
and s̃1 ∈ Sj1 at ŝ2 ∈ Sk2 , i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}, if U1(ŝ1, ŝ2) > U1(s̃1, ŝ2), then for all s1 ∈ S1
and s2 ∈ Sk2 , U1(ŝ1, s2) ≥ U1(s1, s2).














then the reduced normal form game exhibits strategic complements.
Proof. Player 1’s payoff satisfies single crossing condition in {ŝ11, ŝ21} × {ŝ12, ŝ22}, thus





2); in scenario 2, U1(ŝ11, ŝ22) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ22) implies U1(ŝ11, ŝ12) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ12) and in
scenario 3, U1(ŝ11, ŝ12) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ12) and U1(ŝ11, ŝ22) < U1(ŝ21, ŝ22).
In scenario 1, as U1(ŝ11, ŝ12) < U1(ŝ21, ŝ12) and ŝ12 ∈ S12 , no crossing conditions in S1×S2









2) and ŝ22 ∈ S22 , no crossing conditions implies that for arbitrary
s2 ∈ S22 and for arbitrary s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21, U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2). Thus for arbitrary s2 ∈ S12 ,
BR1(s2) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(1, 2)





this normal form exhibits strategic complementarities.
In scenario 2, as U1(ŝ11, ŝ22) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ22) and ŝ22 ∈ S22 , no crossing conditions in S1×S2
imply that for arbitrary s2 ∈ S22 and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ11, U1(ŝ11, s2) ≥ U1(s1, s2). Similarly,
as U1(ŝ11, ŝ12) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ12) and ŝ12 ∈ S12 , no crossing conditions imply that for arbitrary
s2 ∈ S12 and for arbitrary s1 ∈ S1\ŝ11, U1(ŝ11, s2) ≥ U1(s1, s2). Thus for arbitrary s2 ∈ S12 ,
BR1(s2) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)






this normal form exhibits strategic complementarities.
In scenario 3, as U1(ŝ11, ŝ12) > U1(ŝ21, ŝ12) and ŝ12 ∈ S12 , no crossing conditions imply that





2) and ŝ22 ∈ S22 , no crossing conditions imply that for arbitrary s2 ∈ S22 and




1 } for s2 ∈ S12
and BR1(s2) = {s2(1, 2)1 , s
2(2, 2)
1 } for s2 ∈ S22 . For arbitrary ŝ2 ∈ S12 and arbitrary
s̃2 ∈ S22 , ŝ2 ≺ s̃2, since BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s̃2), this normal form game exhibits strategic
complementarities.














and only if one of the three conditions is satisfied
(1) a31 > a33, a32 > a34, min{a31, a32} > max{a11, a12, a13, a14} and a43 > a41, a44 > a42,
min{a43, a44} > max{a21, a22, a23, a24};
(2) a11 > a13, a12 > a14, min{a11, a12} > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and a23 > a21, a24 > a22,
min{a23, a24} > max{a41, a42, a43, a44};
(3) a11 > a13, a12 > a14, min{a11, a12} > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and a43 > a41, 44 > a42,
min{a43, a44} > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}.
Proof. Suppose the reduced normal form game exhibits restricted strategic complemen-
tarities, then the payoff assignments in scenario 1 are a31 > a33 and a33 > max{a11, a12, a13, a14},
a32 > a
3
4 and a32 > max{a11, a12, a13, a14}, a43 > a41 and a43 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}, a44 > a42
and a44 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}.
The payoff assignments in scenario 2 are a11 > a13 and a11 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34},
a12 > a
1




2 and a24 > max{a41, a42, a43, a44}.
The payoff assignments in scenario 3 are a11 > a13 and a11 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34},
a12 > a
1
4 and a12 > max{a31, a32, a33, a34} and a43 > a41 and a43 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24},
a42 > a
4
4 and a42 > max{a21, a22, a23, a24}.
If one of the following three conditions are satisfied, then it is easy to check that both
single crossing condition and no crossing conditions are satisfied.
Suppose (1) is satisfied, then single crossing condition {ŝ11, ŝ21} × {ŝ12, ŝ22} is satisfied
as a32 > a11 and a44 > a23. No crossing condition is satisfied as for arbitrary s2 ∈ S12
and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21, U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2) and for arbitrary s2 ∈ S22 and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21,
U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2).
Suppose (2) is satisfied, then single crossing condition {ŝ11, ŝ21} × {ŝ12, ŝ22} is satisfied
as a23 > a44 and a11 > a32. No crossing condition is satisfied as for arbitrary s2 ∈ S12
and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21, U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2) and for arbitrary s2 ∈ S22 and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21,
U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2).
Suppose (3) is satisfied, then single crossing condition {ŝ11, ŝ21} × {ŝ12, ŝ22} is satisfied
as a11 > a32 and a23 < a44. No crossing condition is satisfied as for arbitrary s2 ∈ S12
and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21, U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2) and for arbitrary s2 ∈ S22 and s1 ∈ S1\ŝ21,
U1(s1, s2) ≤ U1(ŝ21, s2).
Thus the reduced normal form game with those payoffs exhibit restricted strategic
complementarities.
Theorem 3. Under differential payoff to outcome, the following claims are equivalent:















ii. the two-stage game exhibits strategic complements in player 1.
Proof. We can invoke the Theorem 1 in chapter 2 and Lemma 11 to prove the equivalence
between those two claims.
Corollary 5. For every best response sets in the reduced normal form game with restricted
strategic complementarities, their extensive form correspondence are also best response sets
in a two-stage game with strategic complementarities.
Corollary 6. For every best response sets in a two-stage game with strategic complemen-
tarities, their reduced normal form correspondence are also best response sets in a reduced
normal form game with restricted strategic complementarities.
Lemma 2 indicates that there are three possible best responses for the reduced normal
form game with restricted strategic complementarities.
In the first case, BR1(s2) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(1, 2)





for s2 ∈ S22 . The corresponding best response sets in the extensive form is the fol-









3) = a2, 11 } for
sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1




1 = {sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 | sΓ1 (h0) =
a1, 21 , s
Γ
1 (h
4) = a2, 21 } for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }
In this case, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 }.
Similarly, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }. Pick
arbitrary ŝΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 } and s̃Γ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 } such
that ŝΓ2 ≺ s̃Γ2 , pick arbitrary ŝΓ1 ∈ BR1(ŝΓ2 ) and s̃Γ1 ∈ BR1(s̃Γ2 ), ŝΓ2 ∧ s̃Γ2 ∈ BR1(ŝΓ2 ) and
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ŝΓ2 ∨ s̃Γ2 ∈ BR1(s̃Γ2 ). Thus for extensive form games with such best response sets, they
exhibits strategic complementarities.
In the second case, BR1(s2) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)





for s2 ∈ S22 . The corresponding best response sets in the extensive form is the fol-









1) = a2, 11 } for
sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1




1 = {sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 | sΓ1 (h0) =
a1, 11 , s
Γ
1 (h
2) = a2, 21 } for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }.
In this case, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for all sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 }.
Similarly, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for all sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }. Pick
arbitrary ŝΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 } and s̃Γ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 } such that
ŝΓ2 ≺ s̃Γ2 , BR1(ŝΓ2 ) v BR1(s̃Γ2 ). Thus for extensive form games with such best response
sets, they exhibits strategic complementarities.
In the third case, BR1(s2) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)





for s2 ∈ S22 . The corresponding best response sets in the extensive form is the fol-









1) = a2, 11 } for
sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1




1 = {sΓ1 ∈ SΓ1 | sΓ1 (h0) =
a1, 21 , s
Γ
1 (h
4) = a2, 21 } for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }.
In this case, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 }.
Similarly, BR1(sΓ2 ) are complete sublattices for sΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 }. Pick
arbitrary ŝΓ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 1
2 } and s̃Γ2 ∈ {sΓ2 ∈ SΓ2 | sΓ2 (h02) = a
1, 2
2 } such
that ŝΓ2 ≺ s̃Γ2 , pick arbitrary ŝΓ1 ∈ BR1(ŝΓ2 ) and s̃Γ1 ∈ BR1(s̃Γ2 ), ŝΓ2 ∧ s̃Γ2 ∈ BR1(ŝΓ2 ) and
ŝΓ2 ∨ s̃Γ2 ∈ BR1(s̃Γ2 ). Thus for extensive form games with such best response sets, they
exhibits strategic complements.
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I would like to point out that ordinal complementarity conditions imposed on the
reduced normal form are not sufficient to generate strategic complements in the extensive
form. We will show that standard ordinal complementarity conditions (single crossing





1 at {infS12 , infS22} imposed on reduced normal form are sufficient to
generate strategic complements in the extensive form.
Single crossing conditions alone can generate case (1) and case (3) in Theorem 1.
Semi-no crossing conditions serves as a brutal force to enable case (2). Notice that, quasi-
supermodularity condition will not impose any additional payoff restrictions here, thus is
conveniently left out.
First of all, if U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , infS2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , infS2), then single crossing conditions
on S1 × S2 imply that U1(s1(1,2)1 , s2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2), for all s2 ∈ S2. Along with Lemma
9, it is easy to check that case (1) applies.
Secondly, if U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , supS2) > U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , supS2), then the contrapositive part of
single crossing conditions on S1 × S2 imply that U1(s1(1,2)1 , s2) > U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , s2), for all
s2 ∈ S2. Along with Lemma 9, it is easy to check that case (3) applies.
In the case that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , infS2) > U1(s
2(1,2)









2), single crossing condition can allow the scenario such that there ex-
ists ŝ2 ∈ S12\infS2 such that U1(s
1(1,2)
1 , ŝ2) < U1(s
2(1,2)
1 , ŝ2). Thus violating Lemma 1 in
Chapter 2. Semi-no crossing condition between s1(1,2)1 and s
2(1,2)
1 on infS12 ensures that
such scenarios will not arise. And in particular, enables case (2).






















1 on infS22 ensures
that case (1) will be satisfied.
3.4 Relating to MSS’s Work
For the purpose of current research, it worth noting that any extensive form game with
distinct terminal payoffs is necessarily a strong representation of the corresponding re-
duced normal form. With the stage game structure, their algorithm will recover the exact
same extensive form as the original two-stage games and it is a satisfying representation
of the normal form. Thus their research provided a sound theoretical foundation for us
to explore the reduced normal form of the normal form of the two-stage 2× 2 games.
MSS(1994) showed that for extensive form game with distinct payoff at each terminal
nodes, it is a strong presentation of the corresponding PRNF (Theorem 9) and a rep-
resentation algorithm applied on such PRNF can find a strong representation (Theorem
8). I will show that the extensive form generated by the algorithm turn out to have the
exact tree structure as the original extensive form with differences in the way actions are
indexed.
Thus we are comfortable to say that by turning to reduced normal form, we will not
loose any strategic relevant aspect of a game.
For this game, the relevant information sets for both player 1 and 2 are the same, that
are:
S





































































Apply the algorithm on the reduced normal form.
At initial node ω, since S is strict for both players, select player 1. Then Ψ1(s) =
{{S11}, {S21}}. Thus player 1 has 2 choices to make at ω, labeled S11 and S21 according to
the algorithm and leads to node ζ1 and ζ2 respectively where T (ζτ ) = Sτ1 × S2, τ = 1, 2.
At either node, player 2 is the only one who can move. For each Sτ1 × S2, τ = 1, 2,
the unique strict information set for 2 which contains Sτ1 ×S2 is S, and so Xζ
τ
= S. Now,
Ψ2(s) = {{S12}, {S22}}. Thus at the node ζτ , player 2 chooses between S12 and S22 , leading
to two nodes ζ1τ and ζ2τ with T (ζ1τ ) = Sτ1 × S12 and T (ζ2τ ) = Sτ1 × S22 , τ = 1, 2.
Both players can move at ζ1τ and ζ2τ for τ = 1, 2. Now Xζ11 = X1, Xζ21 =







player 1 chooses between {s1(1,1)1 , s
1(1,2)




1 } at ζ11. Similarly, since
Ψ1(X











and {s1(1,2)1 , s
1(2,2)









1 chooses between {s2(1,1)1 , s
2(1,2)




















at ζ22. Denote the two nodes following ζκτ by ζ1κτ and ζ2κτ for κ, τ = 1, 2.
Then,
T (ζ1,1,1) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)




1 } × S12
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T (ζ1,2,1) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(2, 1)




1 } × S22
T (ζ1,1,2) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(1, 2)




1 } × S12
T (ζ1,2,2) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(2, 1)




1 } × S22
Only player 2 can move at those nodes. Now Xζ1,1,1 = Xζ2,1,1 = X1, Xζ1,2,1 = Xζ2,2,1 =
X2, Xζ1,1,2 = Xζ2,1,2 = X3 and Xζ1,2,2 = Xζ2,2,2 = X4.
Thus at ζ1,1,1 and ζ2,1,1, player 2 is choosing from {s1(1, 1)2 , s
1(1, 2)





At the node node reached by T (.) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)




2 }, payoff a11 and
b11 is assigned for player 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, payoffs (a12, b12) is assigned for
node reached by T (.) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(1, 2)




2 }, payoffs (a13, b13) is assigned
for node reached by T (.) = {s1(2, 1)1 , s
1(2, 2)




2 } and payoffs (a14, b14) is
assigned for nodes reached by T (.) = {s1(2, 1)1 , s
1(2, 2)





At ζ1,2,1 and ζ2,2,1, player 2 is choosing from {s2(1, 1)2 , s
2(1, 2)





At the node reached by T (.) = {s1(1, 1)1 , s
1(2, 1)




2 }, payoff a21 and b21 is
assigned for player 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, payoffs (a22, b22) is assigned for node






2 }, payoffs (a23, b23) is assigned for node






2 } and payoffs (a24, b24) is assigned for
nodes reached by T (.) = {s1(1, 2)1 , s
1(2, 2)





At ζ1,1,2 and ζ2,1,2, player 2 is choosing from {s1(1, 1)2 , s
1(2, 1)





At the node reached by T (.) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(1, 2)




2 }, payoff a31 and b31 is
assigned for player 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, payoffs (a32, b32) is assigned for node






2 }, payoffs (a33, b33) is assigned for node






2 } and payoffs (a34, b34) is assigned for
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nodes reached by T (.) = {s2(2, 1)1 , s
2(2, 2)





At ζ1,2,2 and ζ2,2,2, player 2 is choosing from {s2(1, 1)2 , s
2(2, 1)





At the node reached by T (.) = {s2(1, 1)1 , s
2(2, 1)




2 }, payoff a41 and b41 is
assigned for player 1 and 2 respectively. Similarly, payoffs (a42, b42) is assigned for node






2 }, payoffs (a43, b43) is assigned for node






2 } and payoffs (a44, b44) is assigned for
nodes reached by T (.) = {s2(1, 2)1 , s
2(2, 2)





It remains to construct information sets. Since node ζ1 and ζ2 belong to player 2
satisfy Xζ1 = Xζ2 = S and have no predecessors, they are grouped together into one
information set. Since ζκτ belongs to player 1 have every Xζκτ assigned with different
X i, each of them consist one information set. For each ζρκτ belongs to player 2 with
Xζ
ρκτ corresponding to X i, they have the same predecessor ζκτ which corresponds to X i.
Thus they are grouped together as one information set. For example ζ1,1,1 and ζ2,1,1 are
grouped together as one information set.
It is easy to see that the extensive form obtained from applying the algorithm on
the two-stage PRNF yields the same tree structure as the original extensive form with
difference only in the way actions are labeled.
Moreover, for general multistage game with distinct payoff assigned at the final nodes,
the representation algorithm applied on the PRNF will recover the exact extensive form
as the original one with difference in the way actions are labeled.
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3.5 Example Revisited
We explicitly show here that the example exhibits restricted strategic complements. Fig-
ure 7 is the reduced normal form of the two-stage 2× 2 game.
Single crossing condition is satisfied applying to {s1(1,2)1 , s
2(1, 2)






















2 ) = 4. No crossing condition is satisfied as 11 = min{15, 11} >
U1(s1, s2), s1 ∈ S21 and s2 ∈ S12 and 9 = min{13, 9} > U1(s1, s2), s1 ∈ S21 and
s2 ∈ S22 . Thus this two-stage game exhibits strategic complements.
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Chapter 4
4 Multi-stage Games with Strategic Complements
In this paper, we are trying to study what additional structure strategic complementarity
property implied on general multi-stage extensive form games. We will soon discover that
for stage game to exhibit strategic complements, interesting common structure on best
response sets arises. This will promotes a better understanding of dynamic games with
strategic complements.
As noted in previous paper, even in the simple framework, the complicated notations
require lots of attention. The need to deal with more general extensive form games calls for
a better notation system. The following section proposed a way to index information sets
in the stage game by identifying their corresponding strategies. By connecting information
set with their corresponding set of strategies, we can facilitate the study of strategic
complementarity which is a property essentially about the structure of best responses
sets.
4.1 Multi-stage Game
At each stage t, a 2-player simultaneous game is played in which player 1 and 2 is choosing




i , ..., a
t, nt
i }.
We assume that at, mi ≺ a
t, n
i if m < n. There are in total T stage games played. Payoff
are assigned with respect to outcomes in the end of T th stage. The set of all information
sets is denoted as H, in particular, player 1’s set of information sets is H1 and player 2’s
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set is H2. Actions available on each information set h is denoted as set A(h). H ti denotes
the set of those information set h ∈ Hi such that A(h) = Ati. And denote H t = H t1 ∪ H t2.
HT+1 denotes the set of the ending nodes where payoffs are assigned .
For arbitrary information set h ∈ H, SΓ1 (h) denote the set of player 1’s strategies that
are consistent with reaching h. Thus for arbitrary player 1’s strategy in s1 ∈ SΓ1 (h), there
exists player 2’s strategy s2 ∈ SΓ2 such that information set h is reached on the path of
profile (s1, s2). Similarly, SΓ2 (h) denote the set of player 2’s strategies that are consistent
with reaching h. SΓ(h) = SΓ1 (h)× SΓ2 (h).
Now define some relative positions between information sets in the T-stage game.
(i). For arbitrary h ∈ H t and h′ ∈ H t′ if t = t′ and SΓ(h) = SΓ(h′), that is,
SΓ1 (h) = S
Γ
1 (h
′) and SΓ2 (h) = SΓ2 (h′), then h and h′ are reached at the same time,
denoted as h ∼ h′.
(ii). For arbitrary h ∈ H t and h′ ∈ H t′ , if t > t′ and SΓ(h) $ SΓ(h′), that is,
SΓ1 (h) $ SΓ1 (h′) and SΓ2 (h) $ SΓ2 (h′), then h is reached after h′, denoted as h  h′.
(iii). For arbitrary h, h′ ∈ H, if SΓ(h)
⋂







′) = ∅, then h is off the path of h′.
(iv). h ∈ H t is reached right after h′ ∈ H t′ , if h is reached after h′ and t = t′ + 1.
The stage game structure ensures the following claims to be true.
1. For arbitrary player 1’s information set h1 ∈ H1, there exists a unique information
set reached at the same time as h1. Such information set belongs to the other player.
2. Given (h1, h2) ∈ H t such that SΓ(h1) = SΓ(h2), for arbitrary at, m11 ∈ A1(h1)
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and at, m22 ∈ A2(h2), there exists a unique pair of information sets (ĥ1, ĥ2) reached
right after (h1, h2) such that for every s1 ∈ SΓ1 (ĥ1) and for every s2 ∈ SΓ2 (ĥ2),
s1(h1) = a
t, m1
1 and s2(h2) = a
t, m2
2 .
3. For every ĥ ∈ H t+1 and (at, m11 , a
t, m2
2 ) ∈ At1 × At2 , there exists unique (h1, h2) ∈
H t1 ×H t2 such that SΓ(h1) = SΓ(h2) and for all s1 ∈ SΓ1 (ĥ), s1(h1) = a
t, m1
1 and for
all s2 ∈ SΓ2 (ĥ), s2(h2) = a
t, m2
2 .
4. Pick arbitrary information sets ĥ1, h̃1 ∈ H t1, ĥ1 is off the path of h̃1, that is, either
SΓ1 (ĥ
t
1) ∩ SΓ1 (h̃t1) = ∅ or SΓ2 (ĥt1) ∩ SΓ2 (h̃t1) = ∅ or both.
Lemma 12. There exists a unique path connecting arbitrary information sets in the ex-
tensive form of the multi-stage game to the initial node.
Proof. For arbitrary ĥ ∈ H, suppose ĥ ∈ H t, there exists (ht−11 , ht−12 ) ∈ H t−1 such that ĥ
is reached after (ht−11 , h
t−1




2 ) ∈ At−11 ×At−12 such
that for all s1 ∈ SΓ1 (ĥ), s1(ht−11 ) = a
t−1, mt−11
1 and for all s2 ∈ SΓ2 (ĥ), s2(ht−12 ) = a
t−1, mt−12
2 .
Continue identify (ht−21 , h
t−2
2 ) ∈ H t−21 such that (ht−11 , ht−11 ) is reached right after
(ht−21 , h
t−2









1 ) = a
t−2, mt−21
1 and for all s2 ∈ SΓ2 (ht−12 ), s2(ht−22 ) = a
t−2, mt−22
2 .
























which ĥ is reached right after.
To show uniqueness, suppose there exists two different paths reaching ĥ from h0. In
particular, information sets reached on the two paths are same until stage t̂, t̂ < t in
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which h̃ ∈ H t̂ is reached on path 1 and h̃′ ∈ H t̂ is reached on path 2. Thus h̃ is off the
path of h̃′ and SΓ(h̃) ∩ SΓ(h̃′) = ∅. Since ĥ is reached after h̃ and h̃′, SΓ(ĥ) ⊆ SΓ(h̃) and
SΓ(ĥ) ⊆ SΓ(h̃′). Contradiction. Thus the path leading to arbitrary information set in the
multi-stage game is unique.
Thus we can properly index all the information sets in the multi-stage game by identify-











1 ∈ {1, ..., nt}) as the information sets in H t̂ identified in the following way.





2 ) at (h0, h02) and identify the corresponding (h21, h22)
as those information sets in H2 such that for every s1 ∈ SΓ1 (h21) and for every s2 ∈
SΓ2 (h
2
2), s1(h0) = a
1, m11
1 and s2(h02) = a
1, m12




2 ) at the cor-









2 ) and identify the corresponding
(ht̂1, h
t̂







1 ) = {ht̂1, ht̂2}.









1 ) ∩ H1 = h1 can be considered as the initial node in that

















1 ). SΓ1 (h1) can be considered as the set of player 1’s strategy








1 ) to be reached on the path. Similarly, SΓ2 (h1)


















1 ) is reached of the path of profile (s1, s2). For every


















For convenience, if mt1 = infAt1 = a
t, 1
1 , then mt2(mt1) is denoted as mt2 and if mt1 =
supAt1 = a
t, nt
1 , then mt2(mt1) is denoted as mt2.
For arbitrary t̂ ∈ {1, .., T} and ĥ ∈ H t̂, there exists a unique sequence of information
















Since SΓ1 (ĥ) is defined as the set of player 1’s strategies that are consistent with reaching
ĥ and Lemma 1 indicates that there is an unique path leading to ĥ, SΓ1 (ĥ), SΓ1 (ĥ) can also






1 , ..., s1(h
t̂−1
1 ) = a
t̂−1, mt̂−11
1 }.






2 , ..., s2(h
t̂−1
2 ) = a
t̂−1, mt̂−12
2 }.

































1 ) ∩ H2) =
a
T, mT2
2 . It consists a path of profile (s̃1, s2).


























1 )∩H1) = a
T, mT1
1 }, profile (ŝ1, s2) will have the same
















2 , that is, ∀ t ∈ T, ∀ ht2 ∈ H t2, s2(ht2) = a
t, nt
2 ,
Let a1, i1 be infs1∈BR1(s2)s1(h
0) and a1, j1 be sups1∈BR1(s2)s1(h0). Lemma 2 indicates
that for every s2 ∈ SΓ2 and s1 ∈ BR1(s2), a
1, i




Lemma 13. For ŝ2, s̃2 ∈ SΓ2 ,
(i). If ŝ2(h02) 6= s̃2(h02), then all those information sets reached on the best response path
to ŝ2 and reached after h0 are off the best response path to s̃2.
(ii). If ŝ2(h02) = s̃2(h02) = a
1, m12
1 and for all h2 ∈
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}




ŝ2(h2)  s̃2(h2), then BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s̃2).
Proof. (i) Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s̃2) and ŝ1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2). Information sets reached right
after h0 and on the path of profile (s̃1, s̃2) as h̃ and information sets reached on the path
of profile (ŝ1, ŝ2) as ĥ. h̃, ĥ ∈ H2. As SΓ2 (h̃) = {s2 ∈ SΓ2 | s2(h02) = s̃2(h02)}, SΓ2 (ĥ) = {s2 ∈
SΓ2 | s2(h02) = ŝ2(h02)} and {s2 ∈ SΓ2 | s2(h02) = s̃2(h02)} ∩ {s2 ∈ SΓ2 | s2(h02) = ŝ2(h02)} = ∅,
it is easy to prove that h̃ ∩ ĥ = ∅. For all ĥ′ ∈ {h| h  ĥ}, SΓ2 (ĥ′) ⊆ SΓ2 (ĥ) and for all
h̃′ ∈ {h| h  h̃}, SΓ2 (h̃′) ⊆ SΓ2 (h̃), thus ĥ′ ∩ h̃′ = ∅ and {h| h  h̃} ∩ {h| h  ĥ} = ∅. Thus
after h0 and h02 all the information sets reached on the best response path to ŝ2 are off
the best response path to s̃2.
(ii). Form ŝ′2 such that for all h2 ∈
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}




ŝ2(h2) and for all h2 ∈ H2\
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}
{h2 ∈ H2| h2  H
m12(m
1
1)}, ŝ′2(h2) = infA(h2).
Since information sets in H2\
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}
{h2 ∈ H2| h2  H
m12(m
1
1)} are off the paths
of (s1, ŝ2) for arbitrary s1 ∈ SΓ1 , BR1(ŝ2) = BR1(ŝ′2). Similarly, form s̃′2 such that
for all h2 ∈
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}
{h2 ∈ H2| h2  H
m12(m
1




{h2 ∈ H2| h2  H
m12(m
1
1)}, s̃′2(h2) = supA(h2). BR1(s̃2) = BR1(s̃′2).
Since ŝ′2  s̃′2, BR1(ŝ′2) v BR1(s̃′2). Thus BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s̃2).
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4.2 Main Results
From now on, we will be looking at the best response structures with respect to opponents’
strategies under strategic complementarity assumption.
Player 2’s strategies are divided into three groups. Group 1 consist of extreme strate-
gies s2 and s2. Group 2 consists of strategies that assigns different actions from both s2
and s2 at h02. Group 3 consists of strategies that assigns the same actions as s2 or s2 at
h02. Common structures of best response sets within each groups will arise after strategic
complementarities assumption is applied.
Denote infs1∈BR1(s2)s1(h
0) = a1, i1 and sups1∈BR1(s2)s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 ,
Theorem 4. BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
)∪A1∪B with A1 ⊆ {SΓ1 (H
1(i),12,..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂)
)| t̂ ∈
{2, ..., T}, a1, m
t̂
1
1 ∈ At̂1} and B ⊆ {SΓ1 (H









(ii). If there exists ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), ŝ1(h0)  a
1, i
1 , then {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = ŝ1(h0)} ⊆
BR1(s2).








1 , then SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)) ⊂ BR1(s2).




0) = a1, i1 . Information set H
n1(j) is reached on the path of profile (s̃1, s2) and
Information set H1(i) is reached on the path of profile (ŝ1, s2). Lemma 2 indicates that
information sets H1(i) are off all the best response paths with respect to s2. Thus in
response to s2, player 1 is indifferent among the choices at H
1(i) ∩H1.
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Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2) and ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2) and let s̃1(H
1(i)∩H1) = a2, 11 . Strategic
complementarities imply that s̃1 ∧ ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular, s̃1 ∧ ŝ1(h0) = s̃1(h0) ∧
ŝ1(h
0) = a1, i1 , s̃1 ∧ ŝ1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 . Thus there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that
s1(h
0) = a1, i1 and s1(H
1(i) ∩H1) = a2, 11 .
Suppose there exists ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), ŝ1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , ŝ1(H





1(i),..., 1t−2 ∩H1) = at−1, 11 . As H
1(i),12,..., 1t−1  H1(i) and H1(i) are off
all the best response paths with respect to s2, player 1 is indifferent among the choices
on H1(i),1
2,..., 1t−1 ∩H1. Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), s̃1(H
1(i),..., 1t−1 ∩H1) = at, 11 .




1 . Thus there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 ...
s1(H
1(i),..., 1t−1 ∩H1) = at, 11 .
Let t = T , there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 ...
s1(H
1(i),..., 1T−1∩H1) = aT, 11 . This is a complete path of profile (s1, s2). Thus those player
1’s strategy that together with s2 have the same path as (s1, s2) are also player 1’s best
responses to s2. Thus {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , s1(H




1 } ⊆ BR1(s2). In particular, SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
) ⊆ BR1(s2)
(ii). Form s̃2 such that s̃2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 and for all m ∈ {1, ..., n1} and h2  H
1(m)∩H2,
s̃2(h2) = s2(h2) and for all n ∈ {2, ..., n1} and h2  H
n(m) ∩ H2, s̃2(h2) = s2(h2).
Since information sets Hn(m) are off the path of profile (s1, s̃2) for arbitrary s1 ∈ SΓ1 ,
BR1(s2) = BR
1(s̃2). s2 ≺ s̃2 and strategic complementarities imply that BR1(s2) is a
lattice.
Since ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2) and ŝ1(h0)  a
1, i
1 , denote ŝ1(h0) = a
1, t
1 with t > i. Lemma 4
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implies that SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
) ⊆ BR1(s2) and SΓ1 (H
1(t),..., 1T−1, 1T
) ⊆ BR1(s2). Pick
arbitrary s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
). Since H1(t) are off the path of profile (s̃1, s2), all
h1  H
1(t) ∩H1 are off the path of that profile, thus assign s̃1(h1) with arbitrary actions
in A(h1). Pick s̃′1 = infSΓ1 (H
1(t),..., 1T−1, 1T
). Thus s̃1 ∨ s̃′1 ∈ BR1(s2). In particular,
(s̃1 ∨ s̃′1)(h0) = a
1, t
1 thus H
1(t) is reached on the path of (s̃1 ∨ s̃′1, s2). And for all
h1  H
1(t), (s̃1 ∨ s̃′1)(h1) = s̃1(h1). Since s̃1 assigns arbitrary action at the information
sets reached after H1(t), SΓ1 (H
1(t)
) ⊆ BR1(s2). Thus (ii) is proved.
(iii). Pick such s1 in the assumption, then s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)). Pick ar-
bitrary s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
) such that s̃1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1) ∩ H1) = at̂+1, n
t̂+1
1 , it
is a reasonable assumption as information set H1(i),..., 1
t̂−1, 1(mt̂1) is off the path of pro-
file (s̃1, s2). Thus (i) implies s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2). Thus s̃1 ∨ s1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular,
s̃1 ∨ s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)) and s̃1 ∨ s1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1) ∩H1) = at̂+1, n
t̂+1
1 .
Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), let ŝ1(H






1 . Strategic complementarities and s2 ≺ s2 implies that (s̃1 ∨ s1) ∧ ŝ1 ∈
BR1(s2).
Thus for arbitrary at̂+1, m
t̂+1
1





Suppose for arbitrary at̂+1, m
t̂+1
1
1 ∈ At̂+11 ,..., a
t−1, mt−11
1 ∈ At−11 , t− 1 > t̂+ 1 there exists
s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H





Let s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
). As information setsH1(i),..., 1
t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)
are off the path of profile (s̃1, s2), player 1 is indifferent among the choices on those infor-
mation sets. Let s̃1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)∩H1) = s1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1)∩H1),..., s̃1(H











1 )∩H1) and s̃1(H







1 . Strategic complementarities implies that s̃1∨s1 ∈ BR1(s2). Thus (s̃1∨ ŝ1) ∈
SΓ1 (H




1 )) and (s̃1∨ŝ1)(H








Let ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2). As information sets H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, 1(mt̂1) is off the path of profile
(ŝ1, s2), player 1 is indifferent among the choices on those information sets.
Let ŝ1(H












1 ) ∩ H1) and ŝ1(H







1 , mt1 ∈ At1. s2  s2 and strategic complementarities implies that (s̃1 ∨ s1) ∧











1 ) ∩H1) = a
t, mt1
1 for arbitrary mt1 ∈ {1, ..., nt − 1}.
Thus for arbitrary at̂+1, m
t̂+1
1
1 ∈ At̂+11 ,..., a
t, mt1
1 ∈ At1, there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such
that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H





At t = T , for arbitrary mt̂+11 ∈ {1, ..., nt̂+1},..., mT1 ∈ {1, ..., nT}, there exists s1 ∈
BR1(s2) such that ŝ1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , ŝ1(H
1(i) ∩H1) = a2, 11 ,..., ŝ1(H
1(i),..., mT−12 (m
T−1
1 ) ∩H1) =
a
T, mT1
1 . As this denote one complete path of profile of (s1, s2), it is easy to see that
{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , s1(H







1 ) ∩ H1) =
a
T, mT1
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2).
Thus SΓ1 (H











1 , ..., s1(H




1 ) ∩H1) = a
T, mT1
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2).
Corollary 7. Consider the following,
(i). For every s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
), either BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2) or BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈
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SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a1, i} = ∅.
(ii). For every s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nT
), either BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2) or BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈
SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a1, j} = ∅.
Proof. (i). For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
), if BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } 6= ∅, then
SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
) ⊆ BR1(s2). Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2) and s̃1 = infSΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
).
s2  s2 and strategic complementarities imply that ŝ1 ∨ s̃1 = ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2). Thus
BR1(s1) ⊆ BR1(s2).
(ii). Similar to (i).
Corollary 8. BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nT
)∪A1∪B with A1 ⊆ {SΓ1 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nt̂−1, nt̂(mt̂1))| t̂ ∈
{2, ..., T}, at̂, m
t̂
1
1 ∈ At̂1} and B ⊆ {SΓ1 (H





Proof. Proved similarly as Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 implies that if Subgame H1(i) is reached on some best response paths of s2,
then Subgame H1(i),..., 1
T−1
can be reached on some best response paths of s2. Similarly, if
Subgame Hn
1(j) is reached on some best response paths of s2, then Subgame H
n1(j),..., nT−1
can be reached on some best response paths of s2.
The following denotes an important structure of SΓ1 (h) that will be used in later proofs.




SΓ1 (ĥ)| s1(ĥ1) = a
t̂, mt̂1
1 }. Since ŝ2(ĥ2) = a
t̂, mt̂2
2 , for each a
t̂, mt̂1
1 ∈ At̂1, player 1’s information

































1 }, with ŝ2(ĥ2) = a
t̂, mt̂2




, ŝ2(ht̂+12 ) = a
t̂+1, mt̂+12




1 ), ŝ2(ht̂+22 ) = a
t̂+2, mt̂+22















1 } with ŝ2(ĥ2) = a
t̂, mt̂2
2 ∈ At̂2, ht̂+1 = ĥ
m̂t̂(mt̂)
,..., ŝ2(hT−12 ) = a
T−1, mT−12





Now consider player 2’s strategies other than the extreme ones.
Lemma 14. For every s2 ∈ SΓ2 \{s2, s2}, s2(h02) = a
1, m12
2 and ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), ŝ1(h0) =
a
1, m11
1 , if H
m12(m
1
1) ∩ {H1(i), Hn
1(j)} = ∅, then {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = ŝ1(h0)} ⊆ BR1(s2).
















1) ∩H1. Let s̃1(H
m12(m
1
1) ∩H1) = a2, n
2
1 , then strategic complementarities imply






1) ∩H1) = a2, n
2
1 .
Pick arbitrary s̃′1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s̃′1(h0) = a
1, j
1 . As H
m12(m
1
1) is off the path







1) ∩H1) = a
2, m21
1 , m21 ∈ {1, ..., n2}, strategic complementarities imply that
(ŝ1∨s̃1)∧s̃′1 ∈ BR1(s2). As ŝ1(h0)  a
1, j
1 , (ŝ1∨s̃1)∧s̃′1(h0) = (ŝ1∨s̃1)(h0)∧s̃′1(h0) = a
1, m11
1
and ((ŝ1 ∨ s̃1) ∧ s̃′1)(H
m12(m
1
1) ∩H1) = a
2, m21
1 .







1) ∩H1) = a
2, m21
1 .



















1 ) ∩ H2) = a
t−2, mt−22
2 . Suppose there exists
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1 ) ∩H2) = a
t−1, mt−12
2 .
Let s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s̃1(h0) = a
1, i












are off the path of profile (s̃1, s2), player 1 is indifferent among the choices on those in-
formation sets. Let s̃1(H
m12(m
1
1) ∩ H1) = ŝ1(H
m12(m
1






















1 ) ∩H1) = at, n
t
1 . s2 ≺ s2















1 ) ∩H1) = at, n
t
1 .
Let s̃′1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s̃′(h0) = a
1, j












are off the path of profile (s̃′1, s2), player 1 is indifferent among the choices on those infor-




























1 )∩H1) = a
t, mt1
1 , mt1 ∈ {1, ..., nt−
1}. s2  s2 and strategic complementarities implies that (s̃1 ∨ ŝ1)∧ s̃′1 ∈ BR1(s2). Thus














1 ) ∩H1) =
a
t, mt1
1 for arbitrary mt1 ∈ {1, ..., nt − 1}.















1 ) ∩H2) = a
t−1, mt−12
2 , there exists ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2) such














1 ) ∩H1) = a
t, mt1
1 .















1 )∩H2) = a
T−1, mT−12
2 , there exists ŝ1 ∈

















1 . As this denote one complete path of profile of (ŝ1, s2), it is easy to see that



























mT1 ∈{1,..., nT }















1 ) ∩H1) = a
T, mT1
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2).
It is easy to see that Lemma 5 applies to three general cases:





2. s2 6= s2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 and there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) 6= a
1, i
1 .
3. s2 6= s2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, n1
2 and there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) 6= a
1, j
1 .




1), different from Subgame H1(i) and Subgame
H




that are consistent with s2 can be reached on some best response path of s2.




2 }, the following
structures on player 1’s corresponding best response sets are satisfied under strategic
complementarities assumption.





a. BR1(s2) = B with B ⊆ {SΓ1 (H





b. For arbitrary ŝ2 ∈ SΓ2 such that ŝ2(h02) ≺ s2(h02) and let s2(h02) = a
1, m12
2 , B(ŝ2) v
B(infSΓ2 (H
m12)) v B(s2) v B(supSΓ2 (H
m12)).
Proof. a. For arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), ŝ1 ∈ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = ŝ1(h0)}. Let A(s2) =









1 | s1(h0) = a} ⊆ BR1(s2). Thus BR1(s2) =
⋃
a∈A(s2){s1 ∈
SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a}.
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b. Let s2(h02) = a
1, m12
2 and ŝ2(h02) = a
1, m̂12




H2| h2  H
m̂12(m
1
1)}, ŝ′2(h2) = ŝ2(h2) and for all h2 ∈ H2\
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}




1)}, ŝ′2(h2) = infA(h2). Since information sets in H2\
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}




1)} are off the paths of (s1, ŝ2) for arbitrary s1 ∈ SΓ1 , BR1(ŝ2) = BR1(ŝ′2). Sim-
ilarly, form s′2 such that for all h2 ∈
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}




s2(h2) and for all h2 ∈ H2\
⋃
m11∈{1,..., n1}
{h2 ∈ H2| h2  H
m12(m
1
1)}, s′2(h2) = supA(h2).
BR1(s2) = BR
1(s′2). Since ŝ′2  s′2, BR1(ŝ′2) v BR1(s′2) and BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s2). (a)
implies A(ŝ2) and A(s2) exist. Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2) with ŝ1(h0) = â ∈ A(ŝ2) and
s1 ∈ BR1(s2) with s1(h0) = a ∈ A(s2), ŝ1 ∨ s1 ∈ BR1(s2) and ŝ1 ∧ s1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2), in
particular, â ∨ a ∈ A(s2) and â ∧ a ∈ A(ŝ2). Thus A(ŝ2) v A(s2).
As infSΓ2 (H
m12) ≺ s2 ≺ supSΓ2 (H
m12), strategic complementarities imply thatA(infSΓ2 (H
m12)) v
A(s2) v A(supSΓ2 (H
m12)).
Now, consider player 2’s strategy that assigns a1, 12 at h02. Some interesting common
structure on the corresponding best response sets arise. They are discussed in Lemma 7
and 8 in which Lemma 7 can be considered as a special case covered by Lemma 8.
Lemma 15. For arbitrary s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1(i)
), s2(H





a. If BR1(s2) ∩ SΓ1 (H
1(i)
) 6= ∅, then BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1(i), m22) ∪ A1 ∪B
b. If BR1(s2) ∩ SΓ1 (H
1(i)
) = ∅, then BR1(s2) = B
with A1 ⊆ {SΓ1 (H
1(i), m22(m
2
1))|a2, m21 ∈ A21\a
2, 1
1 } and B ⊆ {SΓ1 (H




Proof. a. Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), as H




1 . There exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 as implied by the assumption.
Strategic complementarities and s2 ≺ s2 implies that s1 ∧ s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular,
84
(s1 ∧ s̃1)(H
1(i) ∩H1) = a2, 11 .
Thus there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i)
) and s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 .
And H1(i), m
2
2 is reached on the path of (s1, s2). Let s2(H
1(i), m22 ∩H2) = a
3, m32
2 .
Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), as H




1 . Strategic complementarities and s2 ≺ s2 implies that s1 ∧ s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2),
in particular, (s1 ∧ s̃1)(H




1(i), m22 is off the path of (ŝ1, s2), let ŝ1(H
1(i), m22 ∩ H1) = a
3, m31
1 with
m31 ∈ {1, ..., n3}.
Thus for arbitrary a3, m
3
1
1 ∈ A31, there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i), m22)
and s1(H
1(i), m22 ∩ H1) = a
3, m31
1 . And H






1) ∩H2) = a
4, m42
2 .
For arbitrary a3, m
3
1
1 ∈ A31,..., a
t−1, mt−11
1 ∈ At−11 , suppose there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2)














1(i), m22 ∩ H2) = a
3, m32













1 ) ∩H2) = a
t−1, mt−12
2 .
Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), as H
1(i), m22 and all h  H1(i), m
2
2 are off the path of
(s̃1, s2), let s̃1(H
1(i), m22 ∩ H1) = s1(H
















1 )∩H1) = at, 11 . Strategic comple-








1 . Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T















1 ∈ At1. Strate-
gic complementarities and s2 ≺ s2 implies that (s1 ∧ s̃1) ∨ ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2). In particular,
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1 ) ∩H1) = a
t, mt1
1 .
Thus for arbitrary a3, m
3
1
1 ∈ A31,..., a
t, mt1











1 ) ∩ H1) = a
t, mt1









1 ) ∩H2) = a
t−1, mt−12
2 .
Continue until t = T , for arbitrary a3, m
3
1
1 ∈ A31,..., a
T, mT1









1 )∩H2) = a
T−1, mT−12
2 , there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that
s1(h
0) = a1, i1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 ,..., s1(H
1(i),..., mT−12 (m
T−1
1 ) ∩ H1) = a
T, mT1
1 . As this
denote one complete path of profile of (s1, s2), it is easy to see that {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) =
a1, i1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩H1) = a2, 11 , ..., s1(H
1(i),..., mT−12 (m
T−1
1 ) ∩H1) = a
T, mT1







mT1 ∈{1,..., nT }















1 ) ∩H1) = a
T, mT1
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2).
A1 can be proved similarly and B is implied by Lemma 3.
Lemma 7 implies for s2 that allows Subgame H
1(i), m22 to be reached on the path,
if Subgame H1(i) is reached on some best response path of s2, then every subgames of
Subgame H1(i), m
2
2 that are consistent with s2 can be reached on some best response path
of s2. And if Subgame H
1(i), m22(m
2
1) can be reached on some best response path of s2, then




1) that are consistent with s2 can be reached on
some best response path of s2. If subgame H
1(m) can be reached on some best response
path of s2, then every subgame of Subgame H
1(m) that are consistent with s2 can be
reached on some best response path of s2.
Theorem 2 implies that for s2 that allows Subgame H
1(i),12...1t̂−1, mt̂2 to be reached
on the path, if Subgame H1(i) is reached on some best response path of s2, then every
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subgames of Subgame H1(i),1
2...1t̂−1, mt̂2 that are consistent with s2 can be reached on some
best response path of s2. And if Subgame H
1(i),12...1t̂−1, mt̂2(m
t̂
1) can be reached on some




consistent with s2 can be reached on some best response path of s2. If subgame H
1(m)
can be reached on some best response path of s2, then every subgame of Subgame H
1(m)
that are consistent with s2 can be reached on some best response path of s2.
Once opponents’ strategy reaches critical decision nodes, player i’s best response must
have certain structure in order for the overall game to exhibit strategic complementarities
in player i.
Theorem 6. For t̂ ∈ {3, ..., T} and s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1(i),12...1t̂−1
) with s2(H






a. If BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } 6= ∅, then BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1(i),12 ...1t̂−1, mt̂2) ∪
A1 ∪ A2 ∪B,
b. If BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } = ∅, then BR1(s2) = B,








1 }, A2 ⊆ {SΓ1 (H





1 } and B ∈ {SΓ1 (H





Proof. To prove the theorem, we want to prove the following claims:
a. if BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } 6= ∅, then
(i). SΓ1 (H
1(i),12 ...1t̂−1, mt̂2) ⊆ BR1(s2)
(ii). If there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
















1 , then SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̃−1, 1(mt̃1)) ⊂ BR1(s2).
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b. If there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a1, m1  a
1, i




a (i). Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
n1(j),..., nT
), Lemma 4 indicates
such s̃1 exists. AsH
1(i) are off the path of profile (s̃1, s2), assign a2, 11 to s̃1(H
1(i)∩H1). Pick
arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that ŝ1(h0) = a1, i1 . Strategic complementarities imply that
s̃1∧ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular, (s̃1∧ŝ1)(h0) = s̃1(h0)∧ŝ1(h0) = a1, i1 , (s̃1∧ŝ1)(H
1(i)∩H1) =
a2, 11 . Thus there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 and s1(H
1(i) ∩H1) = a2, 11 .
Suppose there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a1, i1 , s1(H










1 . Strategic complementarities imply that s̃1 ∧ s1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular,
(s̃1 ∧ s1)(H




2 , there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2).
Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
n1(j),..., nT
) ⊆ BR1(s2). As H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 are off the path of
profile (s̃1, s2), let s̃1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 ∩H1) = at̂+1, 11 . Strategic complementarities imply
that s̃1 ∧ s1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular, s̃1 ∧ s1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 ∩H1) = at̂+1, 11 .
Let ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s1) such that ŝ1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
), Lemma 4 indicates such ŝ1 exists.
H
1(i),...,1t̂−1, mt̂2 are off the path of (ŝ1, s2), assign ŝ1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 ∩H1) with a
t̂+1, mt̂+11
1
for mt̂+11 ∈ {1, ..., nt̂+1}. Strategic complementarities imply that (s̃1∧ s1)∨ ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2),
(s̃1 ∧ s1) ∨ ŝ1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2) and (s̃1 ∧ s1) ∨ ŝ1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 ∩H1) = a
t̂+1, mt̂+11
1 .
Thus for everymt̂+11 ∈ {1, ..., nt̂+1}, there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2), s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2)
and s1(H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 ∩H1) = a
t̂+1, mt̂+11
1 .














1 ) ∩ H2) = a
t̂+s−1, mt̂+s−12
2 , there










Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
n1(j),..., nT
) ⊆ BR1(s2). AsH
















1 ) are off the path of profile (s̃1, s2), assign s̃1 with the
following action on those information sets: s̃1(H





1 ) ∩H1) = s1(H
1(i)...mt̂+s−22 (m
t̂+l−2










1 ) ∩H1) = at+s, 11 .
Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1T−1, 1T
) ⊆ BR1(s2). AsH














1 ) are off the path of profile (ŝ1, s2), player 1 is indifferent
among the choices on those two information sets. Assign ŝ1 with the following actions
on those information sets, in particular, let ŝ1(H
1(i)... mt̂2 ∩ H1) = s1(H




1 )∩H1) = s1(H
1(i)... mt̂+s−22 (m
t̂+s−2








1 ∈ {1, ..., nt̂+s − 1}. Strategic complementarities implies that
(s̃1∧s1)∨ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular, ((s̃1∧s1)∨ŝ1)(H
1(i)... mt̂+s−12 (m
t̂+s−1
1 )∩H1) = a
t̂+s, mt̂+s1
1 .
Thus for arbitrary mt̂+11 ∈ {1... nt̂+1}... mt̂+s1 ∈ {1... nt̂+s}, there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2)
such that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2), s1(H









Continue until t̂ + s = T , for arbitrary mt̂+11 ∈ {1... nt̂+1},..., mT1 ∈ {1... nT}, there
exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2) such that s1 ∈ SΓ1 (H













1 ) is an ending node, SΓ1 (H














mT1 ∈{1... nT }








1 } ⊂ BR1(s2) with ĥ = H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2 . s2(ĥ2) = a
t̂+1, mt̂+12





,..., s2(hT−12 ) = a
T−1, mT−12
2 ∈ AT−12 , hT = hT−1
mT−12 (m
T−1
2 ). Thus SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2) ⊂
BR1(s2).
(ii) Proved similarly as Theorem 1(iii)
(iii). From Theorem 1(iii), SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̃−1, 1(mt̃1)) ⊂ BR1(s2).
Pick arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̃−1, 1(mt̃1)) and s̃1 = infSΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̂−1, mt̂2). s2 ≺ s2
and strategic complementarities imply that ŝ1 ∨ s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2), in particular, ŝ1 ∨ s̃1 = ŝ1.
Thus SΓ1 (H
1(i),..., 1t̃−1, 1(mt̃1)) ⊂ BR1(s2).
b. It is implied by Lemma 3.
Corollary 9. Consider s2 ∈ SΓ2 with s2(h0) = a
1, n1
2 ,
a. For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
n1(j)
), s2(H




2 , if there exists s1 ∈
BR1(s2), s1(h0) = a1, j1 , then SΓ1 (H
n1(j), m22) ⊆ BR1(s2) and if there exists s1 ∈ BR1(s2),
s1(H
n1(j) ∩H1) = a
2, m21




b. For t̂ ∈ {3, ..., T} and s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
n1(j),n2...nt̂−1
) with s2(H





2 , i. if BR1(s2)∩{s1 ∈ SΓ1 |s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 } 6= ∅, then BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
n1(j),n2 ...nt̂−1, mt̂2)∪
A1 ∪ A2 ∪B ii. If BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 |s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 } = ∅, then BR1(s2) = B,






1 ∈ At̂1}, A2 ⊆ {SΓ1 (H





1 } and B ∈ {SΓ1 (H





Proof. Proved similarly as Theorem 3.
Theorem 7. For all s2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 ,
i. B(s2) v B(s2) v B(supSΓ2 (H
1
)),
ii. if BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } 6= ∅, BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2) and moreover, if
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B(s2) 6= ∅, BR1(s2)\B(s2) = BR1(s2)\B(s2).
Proof. (i). Directly obtained from the definition of strategic complementarities.
(ii). Let s1 = infSΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
), Theorem 3 implies s1 ∈ BR1(s2). Pick arbitrary
s′1 ∈ BR1(s2), strategic complementarities and s2 ≺ s′2 implies s1 ∨ s′1 ∈ BR1(s2). As
s1 ∨ s′1 = s′1, BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2). Thus BR1(s2)∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2)∩
{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 }
Assuming B(s2) 6= ∅, pick arbitrary {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, m11
1 } ⊂ B(s2). Let ŝ1 =
sup{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, m11
1 }, then ŝ1 ∈ BR1(s2). Pick arbitrary s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2) ∩
{s1| s1(h0) = a1, i1 }. s2  s2 and strategic complementarity implies that ŝ1∧ s̃1 ∈ BR1(s2),
in particular, s̃1 = ŝ1 ∧ s̃1. Thus BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 } ⊆ BR1(s2) and
BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i




Corollary 10. For all s2 ∈ {s2| s2(h02) = a
1, n1
2 }, B(infSΓ2 (H
n1
)) v B(s2) v B(s2) and if
BR1(s2)∩{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 } 6= ∅, BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2) and moreover, if B(s2) 6= ∅,
BR1(s2)\B(s2) = BR1(s2)\B(s2).
Proof. Similarly as Theorem 4.
Theorem 8. Under differential payoff to outcome assumption, the only two-player multi-
stage (t > 1) game that can exhibit strategic complements is the class of two-stage games
with first stage game being a 2× 2 game.
Proof. Consider player 1 only, the cases for player 2 is similar. The proof consists of
two parts. First, we prove that the class of two-stage games with first stage game being
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a 2 × 2 game can exhibits strategic complements. Second, we prove that the rest of the
classes cannot.
Suppose we are considering a two-stage game with the first stage game being a 2× 2
game and second stage game being a m × n game, m, n ≥ 2. The way to show it
can exhibits strategic complements is similar to the first part in Chapter 2 when we
characterize strategic complements for the two-stage 2×2 game. Under differential payoff
to outcome assumption, it is easy to check that strategic complements can be generated
in the following scenario.




1 , ..., a
2, m




1 , ..., a
2, m
1 }




1 , ..., a
2, m−1
1 } in subgame
2 and {a2, 11 , a
2, 2
1 , ..., a
2, m
1 } in subgame 4.




1 , ..., a
2, m




1 , ..., a
2, m
1 }




1 , ..., a
2, m−1
1 } in subgame
4 and {a2, 11 , a
2, 2
1 , ..., a
2, m
1 } in subgame 2.




1 , ..., a
2, m




1 , ..., a
2, m
1 }




1 , ..., a
2, m−1
1 } in subgame
4 and {a2, 11 , a
2, 2
1 , ..., a
2, m
1 } in subgame 2.
Secondly, consider multi-stage games that does not belong to the classes discussed
above.
First, consider a multi-stage game with the first stage being a m×n game, m ≥ 2 and




2 }, then Theorem 5(1)
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indicates that more than one terminal nodes can be reached on the best response path.
Thus differential payoffs to outcomes assumption will be violated.





2 and s2(h22) = A22\a
1, 1
2 . Lemma 15 indicates more than one terminal nodes
can be reached on the best response path with respect to s2, thus differential payoffs to
outcomes assumption will be violated.
4.3 Example



















?̅?1 ∩ 𝐻2 
?̅?2 ∩ 𝐻2 
?̅?1 ∩ 𝐻2 



















?̅?1,1 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1,2 ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?1,1̅ ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?1,2̅ ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?2,1 ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?2,1̅ ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?2,2̅ ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1̅,1 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1̅,2 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1̅,1 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1̅,2̅ ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?2̅,1 ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?
2̅,2 ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?
2̅,1 ∩ 𝐻1 ?̅?
















?̅?1 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?2 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?1 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?2 ∩ 𝐻1 
?̅?
?̅?2,2 ∩ 𝐻1 
Figure 12: 2− stage extensive form
i. Let infs1∈BR1(s2)s1(h
0) = a1, 11 and sups1∈BR1(s2)s1(h0) = a
1, 1
1 .
Thus for all s2 ∈ SΓ2 , BR1(s2) ⊆ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h02) = a
1, 1
1 }.




For s2 ∈ SΓ2 , Theorem 1 implies that BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
11, 12





For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
)\ s2, BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)
For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1
) and s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 , Theorem 4 implies BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2).
If A1 = ∅, then either BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) or BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1
). Then the corre-















If A1 = SΓ1 (H
11, 1
2
), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2). The corresponding payoffs are r
1, 1
1 (=













For s2 ∈ SΓ2 , Corr 1 implies thatBR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
21, 2
2
)∪A1 in whichA1 ∈ {∅, SΓ1 (H
2, 2
)}.
For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
2, 2
)\ s2, BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)
For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
2
) and s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 12 , Theorem 4 implies BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2).
If A1 = ∅, then either BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) or BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
2
). Then the corre-















If A1 = SΓ1 (H
2, 2
), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2). The corresponding payoffs are r2, 11 (=













Under these payoff restrictions, the two-stage game satisfies strategic complementari-
ties.
ii. Let infs1∈BR1(s2)s1(h
0) = a1, 11 and sups1∈BR1(s2)s1(h0) = a
1, 2
1 .
(i). Suppose for all s2 ∈ SΓ2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 2
2 , BR1(s2) ⊆ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) =
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a1, 21 }.
Under this assumption, consider all s2 ∈ SΓ2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 2
2 .
Theorem 1 implies BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
2, 2
) ∪ A1 with A1 ∈ {∅, SΓ1 (H
2, 2
)}, that is, if
A1 = ∅, then a4, 41 (> a
4, 2













For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
2
), s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 12 and s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 12 .
If A1 = ∅, then either (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r4, 31 (> r
4, 1





(2). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ1 (H
2, 1
), that is, r4, 31 (= r
4, 1





If A1 = SΓ1 (H
2, 2
), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r4, 31 (= r
4, 1





For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
2
), s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 22 and s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 12 ,
If A1 = ∅ and (1), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r4, 31 (> r
4, 1





If A1 = ∅ and (2), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ1 (H
2, 1
), that is, r4, 31 (= r
4, 1
1 ) >
r2, 21 , r
2, 4
1 ,
If A1 = SΓ1 (H
2, 2
), then BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r4, 31 (= r
4, 1





For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
2
), s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 12 and s2(H
2 ∩H2) = a2, 22 ,
BR1(s2) = BR
1(s2), that is, if A1 = ∅, then r4, 41 (> r
4, 2




1 , if A1 6= ∅,
then r4, 41 (= r
4, 2





Now consider all s2 ∈ SΓ2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 ,
Theorem 1 implies BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) ∪ A1 ∪B.
For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1
), s2(H
1∩H2) = a2, 22 and s2(H
1∩H2) = a2, 22 . As implied by Theorem
3, either BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2) or BR1(s2) = B.
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If A1(s2) = ∅ and B(s2) = ∅, then either (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 2
1 (>




1 , or (2). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4
1 ) >
r3, 21 , r
3, 4









(4). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
) ∪ B, that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4




1 , or (5).







If A1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B(s2) = ∅, then either (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (= r
1, 4









r3, 21 = r
3, 4









If A1(s2) = ∅ and B(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1
), then either (1) BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (> r
1, 4













If A1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1
), then either (1) BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that















For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
) such that s2(H
1 ∩ H2) = a2, 22 , either BR1(s2) ∪ B = BR1(s2) or
BR1(s2) = B.





r3, 21 , r
3, 4



























1 ; under (5). then either
BR1(s2) = BR








1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ B, that
is, r1, 11 (> r
1, 3













If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1





r3, 21 , r
3, 4



















1 ; under (3). then either
BR1(s2) = BR








1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ B, that
is, r1, 11 (= r
1, 3













If A1 = ∅ and B = SΓ1 (H
1
















r3, 21 = r
3, 4









If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), under (1), BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 1
1 (=








1 ) = r
3, 2
1 =









For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1
), s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 and s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 12 .





r3, 11 , r
3, 3
1 ; under (2). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)∪SΓ1 (H
1, 2
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4













1 , or BR1(s2) =








1 ; under (4). either BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)∪
SΓ1 (H
1, 2
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4




1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ1 (H
1, 2
) ∪ B,
that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4




1 ; under (5). either BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (> r
1, 4




1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ1 (H
1, 2
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4
1 ) >
r3, 11 , r
3, 3








1 , or BR1(s2) =
BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ1 (H
1, 2
) ∪ B, that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4




1 , or BR1(s2) = B, that is,







If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1





r3, 11 , r
3, 3


















1 ; under (3). either
BR1(s2) = BR








1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ B, that
is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4













If A1 = ∅ and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), then under (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 2
1 (>








1 ) = r
3, 1
1 =









If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), then under (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (= r
1, 4









r3, 11 = r
3, 3









Thus under those conditions, the game yields strategic complementarities.
(ii). Suppose there exists s2 ∈ SΓ2 , s2(h02) = a
1, 2
2 such thatBR1(s2)∩{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) =
a1, 11 } 6= ∅. Then for all s2 ∈ SΓ2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 , BR1(s2) ∩ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) =
a1, 11 } 6= ∅.
For all s2 ∈ SΓ2 , s2(h02) = a
1, 2
2 , the conditions to generate strategic complementarities
is similar to the analysis of s2 with s2(h02) = a
1, 1
1 in (i).
For s2 such that s2(h02) = a
1, 1
2 ,
Theorem 1 implies BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) ∪ A1 ∪B.
For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1
), s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 and s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 . BR1(s2) ⊆ BR1(s2).
If A1(s2) = ∅ and B(s2) = ∅, then either (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 2
1 (>




1 , or (2). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2) ∪ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4
1 ) >
r3, 21 , r
3, 4








1 , or (4).
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BR1(s2) = BR
1(s2) ∪ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
) ∪B, that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4





If A1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B(s2) = ∅, then either (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (= r
1, 4









r3, 21 = r
3, 4
1 .
If A1(s2) = ∅ and B(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1





r3, 21 = r
3, 4
1 .
If A1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1
), then either (1) BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that







For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1, 1
) such that s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 , either BR1(s2) ∪B = BR1(s2).





r3, 21 , r
3, 4




























If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B = ∅, under (1), BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 1
1 (=























If A1 = ∅ and B = SΓ1 (H
1












If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), under (1), BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 1
1 (=





For s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1
), s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 22 and s2(H
1 ∩H2) = a2, 12 .
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r3, 11 , r
3, 3
1 ; under (2). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)∪SΓ1 (H
1, 2
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4













1 , or BR1(s2) =








1 ; under (4). either BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)∪
SΓ1 (H
1, 2
), that is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4




1 , or BR1(s2) = BR1(s2)∪SΓ1 (H
1, 2
)∪B, that
is, r1, 21 (= r
1, 4





If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1





r3, 11 , r
3, 3



















If A1 = ∅ and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), then under (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is, r
1, 2
1 (>





If A1 = SΓ1 (H
1, 1
) and B = SΓ1 (H
1
), then under (1). BR1(s2) = BR1(s2), that is,
r1, 21 (= r
1, 4





4.4 A Special Case
Assumption 1. For every s2 ∈ {s2 ∈ SΓ2 | s2(h02) = a
1, m
2 }, there exists a
1, n
1 ∈ A11 such
that BR1(s2) ⊆ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, n
1 }.
Under this assumption, for arbitrary s2 ∈ SΓ2 with s2(h0) = a
1, 1
2 , there exists a
1, i
1 ∈ A11
such that BR1(s2) ⊂ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i




For arbitrary s2 ∈ SΓ2 with s2(h0) = a
1, n1
2 , there exists a
1, j
1 ∈ A11 such that BR1(s2) ⊂
{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 }. Thus for s2, a
1, j
1 = sups1∈BR1(s2)s1(h
0). Thus the results in
Lemma 2 applies here.
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2 }} such that
ŝ2(h
0
2) ≺ s̃2(h02), BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s̃2).
Proof. Lemma 6 and Assumption 1 indicate that there exists a1, m̂1 , a
1, m̃
1 ∈ A11 such
that BR1(ŝ2) = {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, m̂
1 } and BR1(s̃2) = {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, m̃
1 },
both of them are complete lattices. Let ŝ2, s̃2 ∈ S2, since ŝ2(h02) ≺ s̃2(h02), ŝ2 ≺ s̃2. Thus
for arbitrary ŝ1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2) and s̃1 ∈ BR1(s̃2), strategic complementarities imply that




1 . Thus m̂ ≤ m̃. Thus
BR1(ŝ2) v BR1(s̃2).
Assumption 2. Consider s2, s2 ∈ SΓ2 :
a. BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
)
b. BR1(s2) = SΓ1 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nT
).
Assumption 2(a) requires Subgame H1(i), 1
2,..., 1T−1 to be reached on all the best re-
sponse paths of s2 and a
T, 1
1 is assigned to be played in that subgame by player 1. 2(b)
requires Subgame Hn
1(j), n2,..., nT−1 to be reached on all the best response paths of s2 and
aT, n
T
1 is assigned to be played in that subgame by player 1.
Notice here, SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1T
) = {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, i
1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) =
a2, 11 , s1(H
1(i), 12∩H1) = a3, 11 , ..., s1(H
1(i), 12,..., 1T−1∩H1) = aT, 11 } and SΓ1 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nT
) =
{s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) = a
1, j
1 , s1(H
n1(j)∩H1) = a2, n
2
1 , s1(H
n1(j), n2∩H1) = a3, n
3





Assumption 3. For arbitrary t̂, 1 < t̂ < T , for ŝ2 such that
a. For ŝ2 = supSΓ2 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1
), BR1(ŝ2) ⊆ SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1, nt̂
)
b. For ŝ2 = infSΓ2 (H
n1(j), n2,..., nt̂−1
), BR1(ŝ2) ⊆ SΓ1 (H




Lemma 17. Consider the following:
a. If s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
1(i), 12... 1t̂−1
) and s2(H








1(i), 12... 1t̂−1, mt̂
).
b. If s2 ∈ SΓ2 (H
n1(j), n2... nt̂−1
) and s2(H








n1(j), n2... nt̂−1, mt̂
).
Proof. a. Form ŝ2 = supSΓ2 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1
), Theorem 1 indicates that SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1, nt̂
) ⊆
BR1(ŝ2). Assumption 5 implies SΓ1 (H
1(i), 12,..., 1t̂−1, nt̂
) = BR1(ŝ2).
As s2 ≺ ŝ2, for arbitrary s1 ∈ BR1(s2) and ŝ1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2), s1 ∨ ŝ1 ∈ BR1(ŝ2). Let
s1 ∨ ŝ1 = s̃1. As s1  s̃1, s1(h0)  s̃1(h0) = a1, i1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1)  s̃1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) =
a2, 11 ,..., s1(H







1(i), 12... 1t̂−1 ∩ H1) = at̂, 11 }. Thus BR1(s2) ⊆ {s1 ∈ SΓ1 | s1(h0) =
a1, i1 , s1(H
1(i) ∩ H1) = a2, 11 ... s1(H




1(i), 12... 1t̂−1, mt̂
).
b. proved similarly as a.
4.5 Conclusion
For a general multi-stage 2-player game to exhibits strategic complements, interesting
structures on the corresponding best response sets arise.
For example, if player 2 chooses the lowest possible strategy in this game, that is, at
each player 2’s information set, the lowest action is selected. Once player 1’s first stage
choice is fixed, player 1’s best response set must include those strategies that select the
lowest action on each player 1’s information sets reached on the path of play. Suppose a
102
higher action is chosen at the information set reached on such path of play, a diverge from
original path of play occurs. Strategic complements will require player 1 to be indifferent
among all the actions on the information sets reached after such information set thus
generating more paths of play.
Thus, in response to different classes of player 2’s strategies identified by the action
selected in the first stage decision node, to maintain strategic complements, player 1’s
corresponding best response sets must include all the strategies that can generate the
paths of play identified in the paper once the conditions are met.
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